

# Marine Corps Gazette

JANUARY 1954

THIRTY CENTS



# Marine Corps Gazette

JANUARY 1954  
NUMBER 1  
VOLUME 38

## IN THIS ISSUE

THE ANTI-BANDIT WAR.....	Col J. C. Murray	14	
THE OUTLOOK.....	MSgt John J. Morgan, Jr.	24	
OF MORTARS AND MEN.....	LtCol J. J. Wade, Jr.	28	
LANGUAGE NO BARRIER.....	Maj G. W. Carrington, Jr.	36	
AIR INTERDICTION.....	LtCol Samuel B. Folsom	40	
JAPAN'S PREDICAMENT.....	Col J. D. Hittle	44	
THE MAN WITH THE RIFLE (Conclusion).....	Lynn Montross	50	
MESSAGE CENTER .....	1	KOREA AWARDS .....	35
OUR AUTHORS .....	12	IN BRIEF .....	43
PASSING IN REVIEW .....		58	

## COVER



It's no small task getting the three top officers in the Marine Corps to stand still long enough to take their picture. But the effort was worth it, and here they are—Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr.; Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps for Air, LtGen William O. Brice (left) and Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, LtGen Gerald C. Thomas (right). First, careful planning went into the shot. Then, Captain Al Rohde and TSgt Jim Thomas set the stage and used stand-ins to get the lighting and exposure just right. At the appointed time, the three general officers walked in and took their places. The shutter clicked, and moments later the GAZETTE had a cover and the generals were back to work.

## PUBLISHED BY THE MARINE CORPS ASSOCIATION

THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE, copyright 1953 by the Marine Corps Association, Box 106, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Va., and published monthly. Entered as second class matter at the post-office at Quantico, Va., under the act of March 3, 1879. Editorial, Business Offices: Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Va.; telephone ext. 4780 and 9717. Subscription rate, \$3.00 a year; single copy, 30 cents. Subscriptions of all members or honorably discharged former members of the Armed Forces include membership in the Marine Corps Association. Articles, photographs, book reviews and letters of professional interest are invited. If accepted, these are paid for at prevailing space rates. Material may not be reproduced without permission. Picture credits: All pictures official Marine Corps, Army, Navy, Coast Guard or Air Force photos unless otherwise credited.

## Editor-in-Chief

BrigGen R. O. Bare

## Editor and Publisher

Maj Carl E. Walker

## Managing Editor

Capt Paul D. LaFond

## Business Manager

1stLt C. Armstrong

## Promotion Manager

WO Fred T. Stolley

## Editorial Board

Col. R. C. Mangrum, Col J. D. Hittle, Col J. C. Murray, Col R. M. Wood, LtCol J. A. Donovan, Jr., Maj F. I. Fenton, Jr., Maj H. S. Hill, Maj R. S. Stubbs, II, Maj R. H. Kern

## Editorial Staff

TSgt S. Dunlap, Jr., SSgt W. M. Matheson, Jr., Sgt R. M. Drew, Sgt L. L. Preudhomme, Cpl A. Kokinos, Cpl R. Luden, Mrs. Alice Paul

## Business Staff

TSgt R. W. Boltz, SSgt C. Holmes, Sgt T. S. Ward, Jr., Sgt R. J. Caviola, Pfc J. N. Darcy, Pfc R. A. Dinoski, Pfc R. E. Ellis, Pfc J. F. Lipp, Pfc G. Wiltz

## Advertising Representative

Capt Murray Martin, USMC  
2 W. 46th Street, N. Y. 36  
JUdson 2-1450

**Opinions expressed in the Gazette do not necessarily reflect the attitude of the Navy Department nor of Headquarters, United States Marine Corps**

# message center

## Solomons Revisited

Dear Sir:

I thought it might be of interest to your readers to have a report from a recent observer concerning New Georgia.

I sailed from Rabaul, past Bougainville to New Britain in mid-August on the schooner *Evalitta* on a tour of inspection of the various Solomon Islands to look for scrap and sunken ships, as the firm I am associated with is interested in the recovery of ferrous metals.



The vessel entered Munda Harbor over the bar between Rendova and New Georgia, and tied up at the only remaining pier which is now in a fine state of repair. Our cargo of lumber was unloaded by a chain of the native lads, and was brought up to the New Zealand Methodist area, near the beach. The missionaries from New Zealand are the only Europeans left in the area, and they were good enough to provide me with their jeep (practically the only one in operation now on the entire island) for a tour. I visited the airfield and the dispersion areas and was surprised to see that the jungle has again taken over. The trees and shrubs are now at least 20/25 feet high, and the area looks as if it had never been touched. The airstrip has been kept clear, or I should say a portion of it has, and planes still occasionally land there. The vast amounts of material are gone or are so hidden in the jungle that they are not visible. The only evidence of the shelling Munda took is the skeletons of the large dead trees which are still erect and show white and gray through the greenery, the trees showing the scars of shrapnel.

We sailed then through the Diamond Narrows and past Enogai, which appears as if no one had ever

been there, and out through the Kula Gulf and down to Guadalcanal. The main town at Guadalcanal is now called Honiara, and has a population of about 200 Europeans. Once again it looks as if no one had ever been there before. The scrap is mostly gone, Henderson Field is overgrown and the airline uses Kearney Field. There are four ships lying against the beach to the North of Honiara, the only evidence of the naval battles. I was told by the locals that from time to time oil slicks appear off Savo, probably from the vessels sunk there.

CHARLES M. SEIFRIED  
Netherlands New Guinea

## November Cover

Dear Sir:

There's no doubt about it, your November 1953 cover is the finest ever and fit for the best of frames, but the Belleau Wood Marine brings out an age-old question.

It's the patch he wears. We know it's the 2d Army Division insignia, but we don't know the story behind it. Is it an error in the cover or did the 5th and 6th Regiments have to wear it because of their attachments to that division?

J. H. WILLIAMS  
SSgt, USMC  
K. D. JOLIS  
Sgt, USMC

Boston, Mass.



Dear Sir:

With regard to your cover of the November edition of the *GAZETTE*. On this cover, I noticed that the

Marine with the gas mask is wearing a 2d Division Army patch on his left shoulder. . . . I don't think the Marines ever wore that patch. . . .

ALFRED FAULKNER  
Pfc, USMC

Jacksonville, Fla.

Ed: Quoting from Harboard and Lejeune: A Command Precedent in the July *GAZETTE*: "... General Lejeune established the star and Indian-head insignia for his organization [Army 2d Division] so that its members might always be identified." The 4th Marine Brigade of WW I, which was comprised of all Marine regiments in France, was a part of the Army 2d Division.

## Man with the Rifle

Dear Sir:

Having read *The Man With the Rifle* [Part I] by Lynn Montross, I feel that a small oversight in such a great era should be mentioned. The defeat of Mago in Spain by Scipio in 206 B.C. was not the initial reverse



of the Carthaginian host. The start of the chain of defeats that caused the recall of their ablest general was the decisive battle of the Metaurus in 207 B.C. in Italy, one year before Scipio became consular. The battle of Metaurus caused the loss of the war.

R. J. BORGOMAINERIO  
MSGT, USMC  
Parris Island, S. C.

Each month the *GAZETTE* pays five dollars for each letter printed. These pages are intended for comments and corrections on past articles and as a discussion center for pet theories, battle lessons, training expedients and what have you. Correspondents are asked to keep their communications limited to 200 words or less. Signatures will be withheld if requested; however, the *GAZETTE* requires that the name and address of the sender accompany the letter as an evidence of good faith.





**AIRBORNE EXPLORER**—Rugged dependability of Sikorsky helicopters in wilderness operations is again being demonstrated in northern Canada, this time by Hudson Bay

Mining and Smelting Co., Ltd. Here the company's big S-55 is unloaded on a narrow ledge at 6000 feet, where crews are making an extensive geophysical survey.

## AROUND THE WORLD WITH SIKORSKY HELICOPTERS



**ARCTIC ANGEL**—Greenland Eskimos, displaced 80 miles further north by the air base at Thule, are aided by Danish technicians flown in by Sikorsky helicopter. Such mercy missions are routine for Thule-based Air Force H-19s, which have flown as far as 200 miles into the icy Arctic wastes of Greenland on daring rescue flights.



**INTERNATIONAL SERVICE**—Airline passengers whose transatlantic flights begin or end at Brussels can now have the additional advantage of SABENA Belgian Airlines' international passenger helicopter service, in big S-55s, from Brussels to Antwerp and Rotterdam; to Liege, Maastricht, Cologne and Bonn; and to Lille.





**NEWEST SERVICE**—A big Sikorsky S-55 is the newest aircraft to join the National Airlines fleet. The 10-passenger helicopter currently is based in the Miami, Florida area, headquarters of the airline's North-South trunklines. National's Sikorsky is the first large helicopter thus far put into operation by a major scheduled American passenger airline.



# SIKORSKY AIRCRAFT

BRIDGEPORT, CONNECTICUT

*One of the Four Divisions of United Aircraft Corporation*

Dear Sir:

Apropos *The Man With the Rifle*; a few days after the first tank attack ever to be launched, of which I was a fascinated witness, I was trudging forward from the divisional command post in company with my G.S.O.I.—later to attain full general's rank and most responsible command.

Some of the new tanks lumbered by, and it is my recollection that I waxed a bit lyrical about them and their possibilities.

"G.I." patiently heard me out, and then quietly replied, "Yes, of course, they're mighty useful adjuncts in a battle; as are good gunners and a sound sapper contingent. But they'll never win wars on their own. Ultimately, all wars are won in the same way, by the same man—the infantryman; . . . two men in a ditch, and one of 'em comes out alive."

That is as true today as ever it was; and Mr. Montross is rendering real service by banging home the old, old lesson in such vivid terms.

REGINALD HARGREAVES

Maj (ret) British Service

England

Dear Sir:

Lynn Montross wrote an excellent summary of the infantryman in Part I of *The Man With the Rifle* in the November GAZETTE.

However, I take issue with (1) Ilipa, in 206 B.C. being the decisive battle of the Second Punic War, and (2) Mago commanding the Carthaginians. Hasdrubal Gisco, aided and encouraged by Mago, Hannibal's brother, was the commander. It was here in Spain that the Roman Scipio won a brilliant victory characterized by his ruse of threatening to attack in early daylight, delaying to confuse the breakfastless Carthaginians, "fixing" the center and then executing a crushing concentration on both flanks. Scipio shattered the Punic power in Spain and paved the way for his invasion of Africa. But the issue had already been settled a year before, in 207 B.C., along the banks of the Metaurus River in Italy.

My sources are the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* and Creasy's *Fifteen Decisive Battles*.

JOHN A. WHITE

Colonel, USMC

Parris Island, S. C.

## Myth Exploded

Dear Sir:

Most officers of one service have rather definite preconceived notions about the qualities of their opposite numbers of the sister services. This is certainly true of the Army-Marine Corps relationship.

While Army officers admire the Marines for their fighting qualities and exploits, many Army men are prone to categorize Marines as (1) publicity seekers, (2) braggarts about their units, (3) rough and tough, but not particularly smart.



How this reputation has been acquired I am not prepared to say. But I do know that the best cure for this attitude is personal contact—getting to know each other better.

In the advanced class at the Infantry School of which I am a member, the cure has been effected. Two outstanding Marine Corps officers, Majors William Barber and Kenneth Houghton have most effectively exploded any preconceived notions, and have sold the Marine Corps to the 200 American Army and 10 Allied officers in the class.

If these two officers are typical Marines, you people have the greatest organization going.

Congratulations for sending these officers to the Infantry School. I hope that the Army follows the same policy and sends the best we've got to our sister-service schools.

GEORGE S. BLANCHARD  
LtCol, USA

Fort Benning, Ga.

## On Helmets

Dear Sir:

. . . your attention to *In Brief* of the November issue:

The caption which reads "Eighty-four-year-old retired bandsman Arthur DeMarco shows his 1896 helmet to two present members of the Ma-

## THE MARINES ARE COMING...

to recognize more and more the benefits to be derived from United Services' complete low-cost, non-profit insurance program *exclusively* for armed forces officers. Of the more than 145,000 commissioned and warrant officers enjoying the protection of this 31-year-old institution, more than 7000 are in the Marine Corps. Insurance coverage at minimum cost on automobiles, household and personal effects is available through United Services Automobile Association in Japan, Western


Europe, Puerto Rico and the Philippines, as well as in the States. Claims are quickly settled, even in the most out-of-the-way places. Your USAA is an organization of commissioned and warrant officers who pool their funds for mutual protection. Over the years, this plan has resulted in consistently large savings for members. In 1952, \$3,200,000 dividends were returned to USAA policyholders. Take advantage of this sound, non-profit insurance plan, NOW! Save through membership in the USAA. Fill in the coupon and mail it TODAY!



## UNITED SERVICES Automobile Association

Dept. G, 1400 E. Grayson Street — San Antonio 8, Texas  
Without Obligation, Send information on automobile insurance

Car	Year	Make	Model	Body	Pass.	Serial
				Type	Capacity	Number
Motor	No.			Date	New or	Factory
Number	Cyls.	Cost		Purch.	Used	Price
Current Year & State Registration				Age of Youngest Driver in your Household		
Is Car Used for Business Purposes Other Than to and from Work?				Yes _____ No _____		
Name & Rank _____						
Military Address _____						
If Car not at above address, give location of car _____						




**What every industrial executive should know about**

## MICROWAVE

In 1931, International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation became the world pioneer—the *first* to beam man's voice through space by microwave. Today microwave has become the fastest growing communications system for spanning mountains, swamps, rivers and other natural barriers without costly wire

lines—a system that is virtually immune to storm damage.

And today IT&T is still the recognized leader, with its greatly advanced "pulse time multiplex" method of microwave transmission. If your company is planning to set up, expand or replace its own cross-country communication system, look first to PTM microwave. This versatile, flexible, new method provides for multiple speech channels, unattended telegraph, telemetering, remote control and other signaling. PTM microwave is available through *Federal Telephone and Radio Company*, a Division of IT&T.



IT & T engineers successfully demonstrate first voice transmission by microwave, Calais to Dover, March 31, 1931.



**ITT**

**INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH CORPORATION, 67 Broad Street, New York**

For information on microwave communication systems, address: *Federal Telephone and Radio Company*, 100 Kingsland Road, Clifton, N. J.



rine Band. . . ." The helmet displayed actually belonged to 1st Class Musician Frederick O. Patzschke (chief oboist), who served with the U. S. Marine Band from his enlistment in September 1887 to the time of his death in September 1915. The helmet, believed to be the only one in existence, was donated by his daughter, Mrs. Hattie P. Hobbs. . . .

HATTIE P. HOBBS  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

Would you get rid of a brand new car just because it had a flat tire? Very unlikely. Well, we have a similar situation in the Marine Corps which we would like to bring to your attention.

It is a minor problem but, as we have been taught in supply school, there are no minor or unimportant problems in Marine Corps logistics.

The problem concerns the steel helmet and survey or repair thereof. The chinstraps are permanently attached to the helmet; therefore, every time the buckle or the hook on the strap breaks, or the strap itself

becomes ripped, the complete helmet must be surveyed!

Being in charge of the storeroom in our company I have had to survey quite a few brand new helmets just because the chinstraps have become defective. Neither company, battalion, nor regiment has facilities to repair them. Thus, the helmets have to go to Reclamation and Salvage, Marine Corps Depot.

The Equipment Board should design a new-type chinstrap which would be attached to the helmet by means of a simple buckle. Spare chinstraps should be issued to companies so they would always be on hand, like the chinstraps for the helmet liners. Then the individual would be able to replace the defective chinstrap without surveying the whole helmet.

A simple modification like this would save much time and effort for Marine Corps supply personnel.

PHILLIP TSOTSOS  
Sgt, USMC  
VLAD TREML  
Cpl, USMC

Camp Lejeune, N. C.

## Pesos, Rubles and Dollars

Dear Sir:

I have been disturbed during duty in this country and elsewhere outside the United States by the number of interested professional military and naval readers who would like to subscribe to the GAZETTE but of course lack the dollars.



Without being an international financier, it does seem to me that a journal with the standing and the wide circulation of the GAZETTE could well afford to accept payments for subscriptions in currencies other than dollars. . . .

It may well be that this is in fact out of the question in the whirlpool of today's currencies, but my suggestion is that the GAZETTE should accept both subscriptions and payments from anywhere short of the Iron Curtain.

R. D. HEINL, JR.  
LtCol, USMC

Fremington, N. Devon, England

ED: The GAZETTE's current circulation includes addresses within the Iron Curtain. Currency exchange can be handled by any magazine subscription agency.

## First Commandant?

Dear Sir:

Captain Stevens has made a valuable contribution and has performed a service in sketching the personality of Samuel Nicholas . . . (Samuel Nicholas: Innkeeper-Marine, November GAZETTE).

Quoting from his article: "Here he took up duties which resulted in his later being recognized as the first Commandant of the Corps."

Note that he did not say that Nicholas was the first Commandant. . . . Actually there never has been anything definite regarding Nicholas being called the first Commandant. . . . The Corps, of which he was a

Jos. A.

# WILNER

& Co.

CUSTOM TAILOR

SINCE 1897

Your uniform will be individually tailored to your exact measurements with all basted fittings so you're sure of a perfect fit that compliments you—constructed from iron-tough, USMC approved fabrics so you're sure of lasting quality. Wilner's skill gives you the best uniform at reasonable prices. Terms gladly extended. Mail orders promptly filled. See or write Jos. A. Wilner & Co. today!



CORNER 14TH & H STS. N.W., WASHINGTON, D. C.



Got a **complex** movement?

## **THE RAILROADS CAN TAKE IT**

● No transportation job is too tough for the railroads. That's why transportation officers look to the railroads for helpful counsel... for dependable performance. Railroads have the resources to handle any transportation job—one man or a division, a few miles or thousands. So it's good business to use the railroads... every time.

**THE**  
**Railroads**  
**of the United States**

**SAVE 10%** 10% discount allowed for all military travel on transportation requests.  
Also reduced fares for furlonghees.

**America's most complete transportation system**

**You can Rely on**

**Evaluated equipment**



**THE BERNS-MARTIN SPEED HOLSTER**  
The World's Fastest  
Quick Draw Belt Holster

Winchester Arms, Western Ammunition, Smith & Wesson Revolvers, High Standard Pistols, Berns-Martin and Heiser Belts and Holsters, Lyman and Unertl Sights, Saturn Scopes, Mitchell Shooting Glasses, Royal Portable Typewriters and full lines of related accessories by America's finest craftsmen—

**EVALUATORS LTD.**

G. O. Van Orden, Brig. Gen., USMC, Ret'd  
Showroom No. 1, Woodland Dr., Triangle  
QUANTICO, VIRGINIA

**A. M. BOLOGNESE  
AND SONS**

TAILOR & HABERDASHER

QUANTICO, VA.

U. S. MARINE CORPS  
OUTFITTERS EXCLUSIVELY

SINCE 1918

EVERYTHING MARINES  
NEED —

Complete uniforms, shirts, pants, ties, covers, emblems, hand-sewn campaign ribbons, approved swords available for immediate delivery.

*Uniforms made to measure.  
Delivery time ranges from  
three to thirty days.*

member, passed out of existence in 1783 or 1784. The Corps to which we belong today was authorized by an act of Congress on 11 July 1798, and William Ward Burrows was appointed major and Commandant.

Your caption writers are at fault . . . though Captain Stevens does not state that Nicholas became the first Commandant, the "blurb" at the head of the article does so positively state. . . .

F. W. HOPKINS  
MSgt, USMC

Camp Pendleton, Calif.

*Ed: Fiction is stranger than truth. In the future we'll try to "hew to the line." The "quips" have been falling thick and fast.*

**Up Front**

Dear Sir:

In reference to the article *Get With Them* in the November issue . . . a plea for our field officers to go to the front lines: this could leave the readers with a false impression of our combat leaders.

I was with the 1st Marine Division in Korea from the Inchon landing up till November 1951. In nearly every battle engagement during this period I saw generals and field officers of all ranks right up front behind the assaulting units where they remained until the objective was secured. . . . I don't think it is necessary to plead to a Marine of any rank to go forward when the situation calls for it. . . .

PAUL G. MARTIN

Kew Gardens, New York



**Squeeze Play**

Dear Sir:

It's range day and "Maggie's Drawers" are flying everywhere. How about trying this little trick to improve the scores?

Of course, once the man is on the firing line it's a little late to start

teaching the trigger squeeze, but it can help the man who is "bucking" them. Here's how it works:

Cock the M-1 and place a dime on the piece just ahead of the front sight (make certain the dime doesn't touch any part of the sight). If the trainee squeezes the trigger properly, then the dime will not fall off.

E. D. LUCAS  
LtCol, USA

Ft. Bliss, Texas



**Those Additional Duties**

Dear Sir:

In reference to MSgt Crumb's *Company Officer Shortage* in the November GAZETTE, I would like to add a few comments. The so-called "additional duties" which all company-grade officers are required to perform are becoming so numerous that none of them can be accomplished properly. The chores of serving on courts-martial, survey and promotion boards, conducting investigations and the like are essentially housekeeping, but cannot be neglected. When one officer must serve on several of these simultaneously, he sacrifices his primary job of being a company officer.

FLOYD H. WALDROP  
Captain, USMC

Camp Lejeune, N. C.

**Standard Stickers**

Dear Sir:

. . . A standard car sticker for all posts and stations throughout the Armed Forces . . . [is] an idea that will not only save time and lessen the administrative burden but will also save material and prove more economical to the Government.

WILLIE L. LOWE, JR.  
SSgt, USMC

Jacksonville, Fla.





## *A Light Forever Burning*

## *A Voice That Is Never Stilled*

Night comes on and spreads a blanket of darkness upon sleeping cities and towns. Here and there a lone policeman. In the distance a clock tolling the hour.

In the dark silence of the night there is one light forever burning . . . a voice that is never stilled. That light is the light in the telephone exchange. That voice is the voice of your telephone. Its very presence gives a feeling of security and of nearness to everyone.

Whatever the need or the hour, the telephone is always ready to serve you—quickly, dependably, and at small cost.

**BELL TELEPHONE SYSTEM**


LOCAL to serve the community. NATIONWIDE to serve the nation.



**TRIBUTES TO SOME PEOPLE WE ALL LIKE:**  
*from Chrysler Corporation*



**TYPICAL CAREER OFFICER** is Captain Allen Snyder, U.S. Army. Snyder enlisted in 1940, served every enlisted rank, received a battlefield commission after heroic action on the island of Leyte in World War II. Now Faculty Chief of training, 9th Inf. Div., Ft. Dix, N.J., Captain Snyder here instructs a recruit in the use of the flame thrower.



**ACTING OFFICER OF THE DECK** Albert E. Kizis, Lt. (jg) U.S. Navy, directs a change of course on the bridge of the U.S.S. Tarawa. Kizis, a graduate of the University of Scranton, Pa., attended Officer Candidate School at Newport, N. J. Currently on a two year tour of duty, Kizis can ship over for additional duty as he chooses.

PHOTO BY PHILIPPE HALSMAN



**BUCKLING ON GEAR AS HE GOES**, Capt. Richard Davis races for his jet fighter during an alert "scramble" at McGuire Air Force Base. In two minutes, he'll scream into the air, carrying live ammunition just in case it's the "real thing." On the alert 24 hours a day, these skilled jet pilots are key men in the program of the Air Defense Command.



**UNDER A BLANKET** of heavy naval bombardment, Lt. Charles E. Mueller leaps from the mouth of an LVT amphibious landing craft, leading an assault against a fortified beach during air-ground problems at Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Va. Only 23, Lt. Mueller is already a veteran of six years service, plans to do thirty.

# THEIRS IS THE HARD-EARNED JOB OF COMMAND

The Regular Officer in the U. S. Armed Forces today, whether serving at home or overseas, is something unique in the military history of the world, and also in the history of his country.

By birth and instinct a citizen of a peace-minded country, his is the task of command of the toughest and most technologically intricate warfare the world has ever known. His is the job of leadership in morale and in maneuver of his fellow citizens who join him in peace time training or war time urgency. His is often the job of civilian, military, and even diplomatic command in occupied territories far from home.

There was a time when most officers were graduates of the traditional Academies. But today's massive manpower requirements draw much officer complement from OCS, and college ROTC training programs. And war time emergency has seen many capable men commissioned in the heat of battle, to fill the needs of frontline command.

Chrysler Corporation is proud to salute the Officers of the Armed Forces of America. Here they are on these pages, running your Army, commanding your ships, flying the missions that defend your shores. Take a good look at them. For they are the loyal men and women of America who help look after the hard daily business of guarding the country in which you live.

*This message about people we all like is presented by your  
PLYMOUTH—DODGE—DE SOTO—CHRYSLER—  
DODGE "JOB-RATED" TRUCK dealers, and*

## CHRYSLER CORPORATION

*Enjoy "Medallion Theatre"... dramatic entertainment for all the family... every week. CBS-TV. See your local paper for time and station.*

by EDGAR A. GUEST

*They are the ones, air, sea and land,  
Trained to obey and to command;  
Scholars of merit and degree,  
Generals and admirals some to be,  
Chosen as lads, deserving trust,  
Willing to die, if die they must.*

*West Point, Annapolis are schools  
Where honor's held by rigid rules.  
This their high purpose and their plan,  
To train the boy to be a man.  
That done, to serve his country's need,  
His comrades he'll be fit to lead.*

*They are our nation's chosen best,  
Tested by every human test  
For knowledge, courage, strength of will,  
Devotion, patience, judgment, skill.  
At first cadets, but every one  
Men to command as time goes on.*

*Admirals, generals, captains all  
Ready to answer duty's call  
'Til peace shall come and war shall end,  
On them for freedom we depend.  
Men (in salute I raise my hand)  
Trained to obey and to command.*

*If you would like a reprint of this poem, suitable for framing, write  
Chrysler Corp., Dept. RS4, 341 Massachusetts Ave., Detroit, Mich.*

Copyright 1954 Chrysler Corporation



**THE LIAISON OFFICERS** for the defense advisory committee for women in the services leave the Pentagon with Lt. Col. Emily C. Gorman, deputy director of the WAC. Representing the Navy, Army, Marines and Air Force, these officers are typical of the many women who have voluntarily entered the armed forces, finding a rewarding career while making their special contribution to our defense.



**FAST COAST GUARD RESCUE BOAT** speeds victim to shore as Chief Bos'n John J. Gibbs, Commanding Officer of Rockaway Lifeboat Station in New York, supervises resuscitation. Under the Treasury Department in peace, the U. S. Coast Guard performs many vital functions of rescue, patrol, and law enforcement on the high seas.

*This advertisement appears in LIFE January 18, 1954*



# Our authors

☛ Author of half-a-dozen previous articles for the GAZETTE, **LtCol John J. Wade, Jr.**, hit real pay dirt with his *Of Mortars and Men* (page 28).

His essay won the first prize of \$500 in Group I (Field Officers and Civilians) of the Marine Corps Association's 1953 Prize Essay Contest, and it was also selected as the best essay of all groups—another \$500 award! The colonel, a graduate of the University of California at Berkeley, was commissioned in the Marine Corps in 1941 and fought with Marine artillery through the Guadalcanal, Tarawa and Okinawa campaigns. He began his present assignment as Assistant Head of the Ordnance Branch, G-4, HQMC, in August 1952.



LTCOL WADE

☛ **MSgt John J. Morgan, Jr.**, who has contributed *The Outlook* (page 24), recently "shipped" for six after sewing on his fourth hashmark. Sergeant Morgan's first duty station following boot camp was Quantico, where he was a cannoneer-tractor driver in the 10th Marines. In 1939-41 he served as an orderly and guard at the Naval War College at Newport. During World War II Sergeant Morgan earned three battle stars with the 1st Mar Div. After



MSGT MORGAN

the war, he spent a year at Camp Pendleton, but in 1946 transferred to sea duty. In 1948, he went to the Depot of Supplies at Barstow. Recruiting and a short tour as an instructor with the 3d Division NCO School preceded his recent attendance at the Naval Justice School at Newport. He is now with the Legal Section, Force Troops, FMFPac, at Camp Pendleton.

☛ **Colonel J. D. Hittle**, a frequent contributor to the GAZETTE, presents the problems facing postwar Japan in *Japan's Predicament* (page 44).


Holder of degrees from Michigan State College and the University of Utah, the latter a master's in Oriental history and geography, the colonel is a member of Phi Kappa Phi, a national honor society.

Colonel Hittle entered the Marine Corps in 1937 and spent the next two years in the USS *Portland*. After a tour of shore duty with the 5th Marines he shipped out in the USS *Washington*. In 1942 he completed the Division Officer's Course at Fort Benning, Georgia and then received orders to the Marine Corps Schools, Quantico.

Colonel Hittle was awarded the Legion of Merit while G-4 of the 3d Mar Div at Iwo Jima. Later, he commanded the 2d Bn, 7th Marines in China, served another tour at Quantico and was the executive officer of the NROTC unit at the University of Utah. He is now the Legislative Assistant to the Commandant of the Marine Corps.

☛ Attending Chinese language School at the University of California, and later serving as an intelligence officer in China, prepped **Major George W. Carrington, Jr.**, for the job of teaching Chinese Marines on Formosa. His *Language No Barrier* (page 36) covers his assignment as instructor to Chiang Kai Shek's Leathernecks.

Major Carrington entered the Marine Corps in 1942 after graduating from Yale University. As a field artillery officer during World War II he made the Bougainville, Guam and Iwo Jima operations. As mentioned previously, he went to China after finishing the language school at California. Following his return in 1948 he was attached to the G-2 section at HQMC, and in 1952 he went to Korea—springboard for his Formosan assignment. He is now Executive Officer, 3d Bn, 11th Marines at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.



MAJ CARRINGTON

☛ **LtCol Samuel B. Folsom**, who writes, as he puts it, "for amusement and rejection slips," is a graduate of the Massachusetts Maritime Academy. At the present time, however, he is doing his navigating with the Air War Division, Naval Operations,



LTCOL FOLSOM

Washington, D.C. During World War II, Colonel Folsom served at Guadalcanal, in the Central Pacific and in the Okinawan campaign. He attended the Patuxent River Test Pilot's Training

School in 1948 and served in Korea in 1950-51. Since he scored with *Air Interdiction* (page 40), this time, we feel sure, he'll be happy to accept a check in lieu of a rejection slip.

☛ The first installment of **Colonel James C. Murray's** analysis of the Communist bid for control of Greece during 1946-49 will be found on page 14. *The Anti-Bandit War* was written from first-hand information the colonel gathered as a member of the American Mission to Greece in 1949. A graduate of Yale University, Colonel Murray entered the Marine Corps in 1936 through the NROTC program. He was Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, of the 1st Mar Div in the Guadalcanal campaign. He also participated in the Northern Solomons campaigns of 1943, and in 1945 commanded a battalion at Okinawa.



COL MURRAY

With the onset of the war in Korea he went to the Far East to serve on the planning staff of the United Nations Command.

In addition to participating in the defense against Communist aggression in Greece and Korea, Colonel Murray has visited Indo-China to observe military operations. His unusually wide experience is reflected in the scope and depth of *The Anti-Bandit War*.

Colonel Murray is currently serving as Chief of the Policy Analysis Division at HQMC.

# *The Most Trusted Name in Ignition*

## **safeguards every component part of your ignition system**

From Lindbergh's history-making flight to today's record breaking jets, Bendix ignition equipment has played a spectacular part in aviation progress.

While Bendix reputation in ignition has been spotlighted by scores of important engineering firsts, the industry's wide acceptance of Bendix ignition equipment has been built largely on the solid foundation of product excellence in every component part.

Just as a chain is no stronger than its weakest link, dependable ignition is the result of components designed and manufactured for unfailing efficiency.

That's why it pays to insist on Bendix ignition components for every part of your ignition system. Whether your requirement is for a better electrical connector, a complete new ignition system, or the famous Bendix Ignition Analyzer, you can be sure of quality performance when the good name of Bendix safeguards the reputation of every individual ignition product.

Why not consult our engineering departments for details?

### **AVIATION PRODUCTS**

Low and high tension ignition systems for piston, jet, turbo-jet engines and rocket motors . . . Ignition analyzers . . . radio shielding harness and noise filters . . . switches . . . booster coils . . . electrical connectors.


*Bendix*

## **SCINTILLA MAGNETO DIVISION**


**SIDNEY, NEW YORK**

Export Sales: Bendix International Division  
205 East 42nd St., New York 17, N. Y.

FACTORY BRANCH OFFICES: 117 E. Providencia Avenue, Burbank, California • Stephenson Building, 6560 Cass Avenue, Detroit 2, Michigan • Brouwer Building, 176 W. Wisconsin Avenue, Milwaukee, Wisconsin • 582 Market Street, San Francisco 4, California



**IGNITION ANALYZER**



**LOW TENSION IGNITION SYSTEM**



**ELECTRICAL CONNECTOR**



# the Anti

## FOREWORD

*In the confusing welter of international problems engaging the attention of the American public following World War II, the cancer of expansionist Soviet Communism fastened itself in many areas without attracting particular attention. It was not until this malignancy reached out to take control of Greece—the birthplace of democracy—that it was clearly isolated and labeled as such. Thus identified it met determined resistance, the resulting struggle focusing attention of the free world first on the local problem—then the larger issue.*

*Forced into the field of active international assistance by the financial inability of the British to render further assistance to the Greeks, the U.S. decided actively to come to the support of the Greeks, thus taking the lead in developing a policy of containment. The influence of this policy has been world-wide, but it has come into open conflict with expansionist Communism in only three areas — Greece, Korea and Indo-China.*

*The Anti-Bandit War, the first installment of which appears in this edition of the GAZETTE, is the first comprehensive analysis of the first of these three conflicts.*

*Some of the conclusions of the article are unexpected. The effects of U.S. assistance were perhaps more*





# Anti-Bandit War

By Col J. C. Murray

far reaching in the political, economic and psychological fields than in strictly military matters. The military defeat of the Communists was hastened by two notable events. The first was Tito's split with the Cominform, which itself might not have been possible had not American assistance in Greece assured a friendly flank instead of what might have otherwise been a segment of Cominform encirclement. The second was the appointment of Field Marshal Papagos as Commander-in-Chief of the Greek Government Forces.

The study of this first contact between expansionist Soviet Communism and the policy of containment is of more than historical interest. It is of immediate, current and continuing interest. The problems arising from the common frontier with expansionist Communism are not confined to Greece where the present settlement may be transitory. They exist along the entire 20,000-mile frontier of Stalin's former empire. At any point along this front the pattern of Communist aggression in Greece may appear or re-appear in whole or in part. The Anti-Bandit

War, which will be published in five installments, lays bare the anatomy of this pattern and discloses the magnitude of the effort required to defeat it in Greece.

## Part I

IN AUGUST 1949, IN TWO SWIFT blows, the Greek Government forces, 265,000 strong, drove the self-styled "Democratic Army," a force of less than 20,000 fighters, from the soil of Greece. Superficially this appeared to be no great feat of arms! Indeed, it seemed scarcely to merit a second thought save for the curious circumstance that this comparatively small force had withstood the Government forces for three years. That the "Democratic Army" had been able to do this and, in so doing, prevent the establishment of conditions favorable to the reconstruction of Greece, warrants serious study in its proper context. The problems arising from the common frontier with Communism exist today in Iran, Burma and Indo-China as well as in Korea, and the pattern of Communist aggression in Greece, as distinct from that employed in Korea, may

appear elsewhere in whole or in part.

What factors present when the Government achieved its easy victories in Vitsi and Grammos in 1949 were not present when the guerrillas undertook operations in 1946? What factors present from 1946 to 1948 had altered by 1949, and in what respects? Had changing circumstances altered the significance of constant factors in the situation? In short, what were the factors which led to the defeat of Communist aggression in Greece in August 1949?

For the most part, answers to these questions are to be found in events in Greece during the years 1946-49. However, the events of that period have their roots in the German-Italian-Bulgarian occupation and in the liberation. Then too, happenings in Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria had repercussions in Greece. In addition, Greece was near the vortex of the cold-war politics of the great powers and its affairs were influenced thereby to a greater extent perhaps than those of any other nation. Thus reference will be made in this article to trends and events which lie outside the strict geograph-

In partisan warfare, the numerical strength of the guerrilla fighters is less significant than the attitude of the populace.

ical and chronological limits of the anti-bandit war. Moreover, although the article deals primarily with the military aspects of the war against the guerrillas, political and economic considerations inevitably intrude.

## THE OBJECTIVES

### The "Democratic Army"

With the signing of the Varkisa agreement in February 1945, ELAS, the field force of the Communist-dominated National Liberation Front, which had gathered strength by monopolizing the cause of resistance to the occupation and husbanded it for the post-war struggle for control of Greece, acknowledged defeat. But this did not signalize the Communist Party's abandonment of the struggle for power. Although 40,000 weapons were surrendered under the agreement, they were largely unserviceable. The better weapons were cached away for the next round. Although most of the members of ELAS returned to their homes, 4,000 crossed the frontier to find sanctuary with the satellite neighbors. Others remained in the mountains, potential nuclei for future bands. These were hardcore Communists or criminals who could not expect to benefit by the partial amnesty features of the Varkisa pact.

As the facade of the National Liberation Front, behind which the Greek Communist Party had originally marshalled its forces, fell away, the party leaders sought new catalysts. They found them in continued economic distress, the inability of political leaders to establish an effective government and in extremes in the treatment of the opposition by rightist groups.

Having previously failed to gain control of Greece by political maneuvering and outright revolution, the Communists now sought to achieve it as a consequence of the incorporation of Greece or parts of it in a Communist federation of the Balkans. Their purpose was to facilitate the imposition from without of what they had failed to achieve from within. They had only to create the vacuum into which external forces, which stood waiting, could flow.

Thus, when the bands began to re-form following the first post-war election, the Communists sought to

prostrate the economy and discredit the government preparatory to their later, but unsuccessful, effort to establish a satellite-recognized "Government of Free Greece," or to detach Greek Macedonia and even possibly Epirus and Thrace, through annexation by Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria, respectively.

### Government Forces

The assumption of the initiative by the guerrillas tended to define the objectives of the Government. These were to establish and maintain conditions of economic and political stability within Greece, to suppress the disruptive guerrilla forces and to interdict the aid to the guerrillas which began to flow across the northern borders.

## SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS, 1946-49

### Guerrilla Operations

Guerrilla warfare distinguishable from that of 1942-44 only by its greater ferocity began to burgeon here and there during the summer of 1946. Initially it was confined to areas near the northern border but right-wing extremists retaliated in kind in the south, giving the disorder a seemingly widespread character which the Communists, unaided, could not have accomplished. Thus attention was diverted from the area in which internal disorder could have been attributed to foreign intervention and the Communists won an early advantage in their ability to camouflage the war as a domestic affair—the Greek people against the Government in Athens.

Although the Varkisa agreement did not so promise, it may have been understood that British troops were to be withdrawn from Greece following the plebiscite on the return of the King scheduled for August. In view of this, the Communists refrained from extending the scope of the disorder before then. But when British troops remained beyond that date, Communist leaders were unwilling to delay longer. Guerrilla activity, seriously resumed after the election in March, was unleashed on an increased scale in late September.

The situation developed along the lines of the following schematic and highly rationalized outline:

The campaign began with the

murder of isolated officials—individual gendarmes or mayors of small villages, and the beating and threatening of right-wing citizens of prominence. Murders were committed "for giving information." Publicity was given to both the event and its cause to discourage recourse of citizens to their officials. These activities threw a heavy burden on the Gendarmerie which had to extend its patrolling and disperse its forces in an effort to maintain public morale in the affected areas.

Attacks on small patrols and posts of the Gendarmerie forced the Gendarmerie to consolidate—to decrease the number of patrols to increase their strength.

Then came raids on small villages abandoned by the Gendarmerie. Their purpose was to obtain food and improve bandit security.

Next came attacks on larger Gendarmerie detachments—those of 30 to 40 men. This confined the Gendarmerie to the larger towns in the affected areas. Finally the Army was called in.

The tactics used against the Gendarmerie were now called into play against the Army. Small posts and patrols were attacked by superior forces. This forced the Army to concentrate, but by this time the guerrillas were able to direct attacks against the frontier posts of the Army and against isolated garrisons of company size.

A number of fairly well-defined bandit areas now had been established in which Army forces could not move or operate except in considerable strength.

Within these areas strong bands conducted systematic raids on villages and towns. They removed foodstocks and animals and drove inhabitants from their homes, sometimes murdering the residents of one village before warning the occupants of others to leave. Thus, the guerrillas embarrassed the Government by creating a refugee problem and aggravating the food shortage in a country already within sight of starvation.

To further isolate the "bandit areas" from Government influence, the guerrillas initiated the attack and sabotage of communications. Endeavoring to protect its own lines of communication and answering the





growing political demand for protection of towns and public utilities further reduced the Army's potential for offensive operations.

The Government forces, by now engaged in full-scale operations against the bands, achieved some success but the bandits avoided being brought to decisive action. The Army frontier posts had been forced to concentrate, leaving large stretches of the frontier unwatched. When guerrillas in the north were hard pressed they merely withdrew across

the border where pursuit was arrested by satellite frontier guards.

Having tested the offensive capabilities of the Army, the bandits in late 1947 began to try to hold ground in certain areas to protect their supply routes. Moreover, the Communists were ready to play their trump card, the establishment of the "Provisional Democratic Government." To give substance to this fiction they had to be able to show that a reasonably large area was controlled by the "Free Government." This government was proclaimed in

the Grammos area on 24 December 1947.<sup>1</sup>

### Guerrilla Strategy

The foregoing outline stresses the military aspects of the operations of the "Democratic Army," but it does not conceal the salient characteristic of guerrilla strategy; that is, that it was economic, political and terroristic and, only in the last instance, military. The guerrilla offensive was directed not against the armed forces, but against unarmed civilians, the public services, lines of communication, transportation, commerce, industry and agriculture—the warp and woof of the economic, political and social order. Such operations as were conducted against the Army were directed to attainment of greater freedom of action as regards the real objective, destruction of the economic, political and social order. The guerrilla strategy was neither offensive nor defensive; it was evasive. Later it began to develop a defensive character in certain areas along the northern frontier. Elsewhere, evasion remained the keynote of military strategy. Meanwhile the real war, the war of destruction and sabotage of the life of the nation, continued unabated.

### Campaigns of the Greek National Army

The Army's first major campaign was initiated in April 1947. The plan was to attack first in central Greece and then sweep gradually northward to the border, destroying the guerrillas along the way. Thereafter the border would be sealed against re-infiltration. Tactically, areas containing guerrilla concentrations were to be isolated and sur-

<sup>1</sup>NOTE: This stroke turned out to be a dud due largely to an immediate reaction by the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans, and the United States Government. The former on 29 December adopted the following resolution:

"The Committee is of the opinion that a recognition, even de facto, of the movement describing itself as the 'Provisional Democratic Greek Government' followed by direct or indirect aid and assistance to an insurrectionary movement against the Government of a Member of the United Nations in defiance of international law, peace treaties and principles of the Charter, would constitute a grave threat to the 'maintenance of international peace and security.'"

Two days later, in its first interim report,

the Special Committee pointed out that any act of association with that "Government" on the part of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, of the type envisaged in the aforesaid resolution, might render impossible the implementation of its mandate and might impel the Special Committee to recommend the convocation of a special session of the General Assembly.

A press release by the U. S. Department of State on December 30 put the United States on record as follows:

"The claim of certain Communist guerrilla leaders that they have established at some unknown point a 'First Provisional Democratic Government of Free Greece' is a transparent device, the true purpose of which will be clear to everyone. It is only a phase in the familiar effort of certain

elements to overthrow the legitimate and recognized Greek Government and to threaten the territorial integrity and political independence of Greece. It came as no surprise. In itself, it would not materially change the existing situation.

"But if other countries were to recognize the group, this step would have serious implications. It would be clearly contrary to the principles of the United Nations Charter. And if the country concerned were one of Greece's neighbors to the north, the act would constitute an open disregard of the recent recommendations of the United Nations Assembly, as set forth in the resolution of last October."

As a result of these statements no formal recognition of the "Government of Free Greece" took place.



rounded, whereupon the trapped guerrillas were to be annihilated.

After some months it was recognized that this campaign was a failure. During its course the guerrillas waxed in strength and influence. A series of operations planned for the winter months was cancelled. Following a re-organization, a new series of operations was begun in April 1948. A preliminary phase to clean up south-central Greece appeared to go well, but the timetable lagged and the guerrillas consistently escaped the planned encirclements. The campaign culminated in a battle for the Grammos Mountain area which began on 29 June. There, 12 to 15,000 guerrillas defended themselves for two-and-a-half months against the attack of 50,000 Government troops. The guerrillas eventually withdrew into Albania, but immediately re-appeared in the Mt. Vitsi area to the northeast. Operations against this new position failed. Meantime, guerrilla activity increased elsewhere, particularly in the Peloponnese where the guerrillas gained the initiative.

By midwinter the guerrillas had re-established themselves in the Grammos area but the Army, employing 25,000 men, was wresting the initiative from 3,500 guerrillas in the Peloponnese. Meanwhile, the Army was preparing the 1949 campaign. It opened with another clearing operation in central Greece. As in 1948, this phase proceeded successfully. By the end of June it was in the mop-up stage and the concentration of troops for the Grammos-Vitsi phase was started. Following a diversion in the Grammos area, an attack was launched in the Vitsi area on 10 August. Within three days the position had been over-run. Of a guerrilla garrison of 7,000, approximately 5,000 withdrew to Albania. In the Grammos operation launched on 24 August, the 200 square miles of the area was occupied in five days. Four thousand guerrillas withdrew into Albania.

## NUMERICAL STRENGTHS

### The "Democratic Army"

Guerrilla manpower may be measured in terms of three categories of personnel — those serving with the bands in Greece, self-defense collaborators and bandit reserves outside



Acme  
**ELAS — nuclei for future bands**

Greece. The first category indicates the immediate combat strength of the "Democratic Army." The number of collaborators gives a measure of the intelligence, security and administrative services available to the bands. The numbers outside Greece included wounded fighters, recruits in training and personnel engaged in training or logistical activities. To these may be added a number of older men and women and abducted children of no combat value. This figure provides an index as to the number of replacements and reserves available to the bands. It is, therefore, a measure of their staying power.

Supplementing the three categories of personnel listed above were undetermined hundreds of Yugoslavs, Albanians and Bulgarians who worked behind the borders of those countries to aid the guerrillas.

### Personnel with bands in Greece

The rebels started operations in 1946 with a strength of 2,500 fighters. By the end of the year it had reached 8,000. In April 1947 it was 14,250 and in November 18,000, where it began to level off. From this time onward the number of guerrilla fighters, in spite of a one-time peak of 26,000, was maintained so constantly between 20,000 to 25,

000 as to raise the conjecture that this may have been the established personnel allowance for the bands in Greece.

Since the guerrillas might logically have sought to augment their combat strength until they could overcome the Government by sheer force of numbers, the suggestion that they may have been working under a manpower ceiling arouses speculation as to why, if it was the case, did the guerrillas accept this ceiling? Was the decision based on political, operational or logistical grounds? On the surface there would seem to be no objection on political grounds to unlimited expansion. However, most of the latter-day recruits had had no previous affiliation with the Communist Party. Though they might be indoctrinated in Communism they could not be exdoctrinated from Hellenism. Since the leaders at this time were working for the partition of Greece, they may have thought it unwise to admit too much nationalism to the bands. Greek nationalism was acceptable as a propaganda line but it could be permitted no real voice in the guerrilla government.

Operationally there was surely a requirement for greater strength. But was the requisite control mechanism present? Perhaps the decision to limit the number of fighters was dictated by the inability of the leaders to control them in combat when the percentage of forced recruits in relation to volunteers became too high. Possibly, too, the limitation was based upon logistical considerations. Dependence upon the satellites for logistical support was great. The bottleneck may have been the non-availability of equipment and supplies, or it may have been in the limited capacity of the sometimes tenuous supply line from sources in the satellite sanctuary to users in Greece. Whatever the reason, the number of fighters serving with the guerrillas remained in the vicinity of 20,000 to 25,000, except during the initial build-up and again just prior to the collapse. At this latter time the strength had fallen to less than 18,000.

### Collaborators

The numerical strength of the "self defense" element of the guer-

rilla movement can only be estimated. The value of the collaborator lay in the fact that he was not known—in daylight a peasant tilling his fields, at night he might bear intelligence to a guerrilla headquarters or place mines in the highway. Some were discovered; others never will be. Their number was great. The magnitude is indicated by the capture or surrender of 1,600 collaborators in connection with the military defeat of a force of 3,600 guerrillas in the Peloponnese in early 1949. The ratio of collaborators to guerrillas was even higher on the mainland, particularly near the northern frontiers where the guerrillas exercised domination for long periods of time and where the price of survival, in many instances, was collaboration. An indication of the potential for collaboration is available elsewhere. The three elections held since 1949 show that at least 200,000 males of voting age were favorably disposed toward, or susceptible to the influence of the Communists. This does not mean, of course, that all were active collaborationists, but it is a factor to be kept in mind in assessing the strength of the guerrillas.

#### **Bandit reserve outside Greece**

Many of those serving in the bands when warfare was renewed had enjoyed the hospitality of the northern neighbors prior to the call to action. The number crossing into the satellites following the signing of the Varkisa agreement was about 4,000, and the numbers of bandits harbored in Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria thereafter did not fall below this. A representative estimate of the number of Greek rebels in the satellites during the war is: Albania—4,500 combat effectives and 6,500 non-effectives, including older men and women, wounded fighters and children; Bulgaria—2,000 to 2,500 combat effectives and 2,500 non-effectives; and Yugoslavia—4,000 combat effectives and perhaps 10,000 non-effectives.

Few of these reserves were committed during the final battles and these from Albania and Bulgaria only. Tito's closing of the Greek-Yugoslavia border in July 1949 quarantined 4,000 combat effectives in Yugoslavia and drove a wedge between the main strength of the guerrillas in central Greece and 2,000 to

2,500 guerrillas in Bulgaria and 2,500 in east Macedonia and Thrace. The latter, having been deprived of the protected east-west route north of the frontier, could not move to the support of central Greece as Government forces controlled the region between sea and frontier in central Macedonia. Thus, the closing of the border resulted in an outright loss to the guerrillas of 4,000 fighters and isolated as many as 5,000 more from the balance of the guerrilla forces. This was a personnel loss of from 30 to 35 percent.

#### **Sources of guerrilla manpower**

Sometime early in the war, possibly after the frontier incidents were called to the attention of the United Nations in December 1946, a guerrilla policy decision must have been reached that Greeks only would be used in the war against Greece. The hearings before the United Nations Commission produced some evidence of the presence among the guerrillas of personnel of foreign nationality. There were occasional sightings of individuals or small parties wearing the uniforms of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria or Albania inside Greek territory. But the sense of the evidence supports the view that in order to further the concept of civil war there was initially a decision against employing in Greece the international brigades of the Spanish civil war.

Later there were indications that this policy may have been revised.

There were rumors, for example, of enlistments for duty in Greece in the satellites, in East Germany and even in Western nations, including the United States. If such enlistments were actually made, the war had come to an end before they appeared on the field of battle.

The guerrilla leaders, therefore, had only one major source of manpower—Greece. The earliest additions to the original 2,500 were the easiest. Perhaps nothing was needed beyond the establishment of a rallying point. They were ex-partisans, adventurers and criminals, but they included some simple country folk who had fallen victim to Communist propaganda. There were also citizens who had been the victim of unreasoning discrimination since the 1944 revolution. Meantime, a vigorous campaign of propaganda justifying and extolling the program of the guerrillas and calumniating the Government was launched. In the absence of effective action on the part of the Government, the conviction was growing that the guerrillas might win this second round. This prospect attracted many volunteers from leftist elements of the population.

By November 1947 the guerrilla strength had reached a figure of 18,500, in substance the figure at which it was maintained for the next two years. Volunteer recruiting, however, was no longer supplying the required numbers. The most extreme



***Terrorism — a part of guerrilla strategy***



of the dissidents had already joined up. The 1947 campaign of the Army, although far from successful, was producing significant guerrilla casualties. Their effect was dual. The guerrillas required more personnel to maintain their strength just as potential recruits were discouraged from enlisting. Moreover, there was at this time increasing evidence of U.S. interest in Greece which tended to fill the vacuum of direction and objective created by the ineffectiveness of the Government and by the waning of the United Kingdom's effort in Greece. Evidence of U.S. interest was not confined to the purposeful utterances of American officials. Military equipment and war materials were beginning to be unloaded at the ports to spread out over the land. This was a language the pragmatic Greek could best understand. A "wait and see" attitude developed among potential volunteers.

No longer able to maintain their strength by volunteers, the guerrillas resorted to forced recruiting — a method of procurement based upon threats, holding of families as hostages and recruiting raids during which young men and women of combat age were abducted. This eventually became the primary method of obtaining personnel. Of 18,500 guerrillas in Greece just before the final battles, as many as 11,000 were forced recruits. Moreover, the increasing numbers of women suggest that even this method of recruiting could no longer provide male fighters to maintain the strength of the bands.

#### **Casualty rate in relation to recruiting rate**

From 1946 to early 1949 the guerrillas suffered an average of approximately 1,500 casualties per month and recruited at the rate of about 2,000. From January to July, the six months preceding the withdrawal of the "Democratic Army" from Greece, there were significant changes in both casualty and recruiting rates. The former rose to a monthly average of 4,000 while the latter declined to an average of 1,000.

These trends were resulting in a growing shortage of guerrilla manpower. Eventually they could have led only to contraction of the guer-



*Above: As the pressure grew, the guerrillas drafted more women*

rilla order of battle. The decline in recruiting may have been cause or it may have been effect. Guerrillas may have been unable to procure sufficient recruits to maintain their strength or guerrilla leaders may have reached a decision as to the future conduct of the war. If a cause, the decline in recruiting must have been a weighty factor in inducing the guerrilla leaders to suspend military operations.

#### **Government forces**

Ground forces employed by the Government in military or para-military functions during the anti-bandit war included the National Army, the National Defense Corps, the Gendarmerie and armed civilians. The strengths of all components were increased from time to time as the

*Right: Collaborators are rounded-up by Government forces*

*Below: Mt. Grammos—200 square miles taken in a five-day campaign*



Wide World



magnitude of the task of eliminating the guerrillas was more fully appreciated and as the means for maintaining larger forces became available.

### The National Army

When the Government returned to Athens in October 1944, the only remnants of the pre-war Army were two units; the 3d Brigade of 2,000 men and the "Sacred Squadron" of 600 to 800 officers. The United Kingdom undertook to equip and train a new Army. The objective was to make it an effective force of 100,000 by 1948. However, by April 1947 the need for employing the Army against the bandits resulted in decisions to revise its strength upward to 120,000 and to shorten the planned training program.

In early 1948 it was increased to 132,000. A temporary increase of

Commander-in-Chief that it be raised to 250,000. This, however, proved to be unnecessary.

### The National Defense Corps

The problems experienced by the Army in protecting the civil community during the summer and fall of 1947 suggested the formation of an organization to provide a static defense of towns and villages. Immediately after the liberation, when there had been no instrumentality to take control of the territories previously dominated by ELAS, a National Civil Guard had been formed. It had combined certain of the normal functions of the police and the Army. It was hastily organized, poorly controlled, and given to excesses, and no one was sorry when the Gendarmerie replaced it in November 1945. This experience, however, provided a precedent which was drawn

was hoped that the civil community could be protected and the Army freed to go after the guerrillas without greatly increasing the dislocation of the national life and economy. Further, it was expected that the poorly organized civilian components could be dissolved and the Gendarmerie reduced to its normal strength.

In January 1948, the goal for the National Defense Corps was changed to 100 battalions of 500 men each—a total of 50,000. Ninety-seven of these units were eventually formed, but the "minute-man" principle was gradually abandoned. More and more NDC battalions were "vitalized" and redesignated as light infantry battalions. As such, their status was undistinguishable from other units of the Army.

### Gendarmerie and Civil Police

The Gendarmerie in Greece is an armed police force which, under the Ministry of Justice, maintains order except within the limits of towns having municipal police. Its normal strength is about 20,000. The organization had fallen into disrepute through continuing to function under the German occupation authorities and, although there was no evidence of extensive active collaboration, it was considered necessary to rebuild it from the ground up following the liberation. In this task the Government was aided by a British Police and Prisons Mission. Under its guidance the Gendarmerie was reconstituted and in November 1945 it resumed its duties. Owing to the growing threat to public order its strength was increased to 32,000, but even this was insufficient. The disorder had grown beyond police proportions. Efforts to use the Gendarmerie in army-like operations were unsuccessful. It was not equipped or trained to function in this manner. Moreover, while the Gendarmerie played soldier, its primary function suffered. A policeman's usefulness depends on his local knowledge—a familiarity with people and places that enables him to detect the unusual. Police cannot be organized in large units and moved from place to place without sacrificing an important principle of police organization. Consequently, when the National Defense Corps



Wide World

15,000 was decided upon in April to permit the training of replacements for casualties during the projected campaign. This brought the authorized strength of the Army to 147,000. In November this temporary strength was made permanent.

As realization of the inconclusive character of the 1948 campaign spread, both the Greek Government and the British Military Mission advocated further increases in the strength of the Army. In fact, it was one of the conditions put forward by General Papagos as a prerequisite to his acceptance of the position as

upon in meeting the new problem.

In October 1947 it was decided to form a National Defense Corps under Army control. The initial authorization was for 40 battalions of 500 men each—a total of 20,000. Cadres for the battalions were provided by the Army and the fillers were ex-servicemen. Men from the same locality were placed in the same battalion. After a short period of training a battalion was posted to the region from which its members came. The theory was that they could live at home, functioning on a "minute-man" basis. In this way it



Wide World

*Guerrillas are marched through the streets after capture by Government forces*

was formed the Gendarmerie was reduced in strength and confined to police work. Its strength thereafter was maintained at about 25,000.

#### **Armed civilians**

During and following the 1944 revolution, rightist bands were formed to combat ELAS troops. They were not well controlled and were sometimes guilty of excesses which helped to swell the ranks of those opposed to the Government. Consequently when fighting broke out again, British and later American advisors objected to arming civilians. This did not prevent the formation of civilian components nor equipping them with obsolete weapons available to the Government. Eventually the British and Americans were forced to recognize that the combined efforts of the Army, National Defense Corps and

Gendarmerie could not protect all the villages from guerrilla attack. They therefore approved the distribution of rifles to certain civilian components.

Initially the most formally organized groups were MAD and MAY. The former was organized by local political leaders for defense of their own villages. Its arms were provided by the Government. The MAY units were civilians recruited by the Army for service in the general vicinity of their homes. The members of both organizations were volunteers, were not paid and could not be forced to serve. Although both groups collaborated with the Army, its actual control over them was limited.

At a later date refugees were organized and equipped for home defense before their departure from refugee camps, and the defense of a

village was established by an MEA unit prior to the return of the women and children. This new program was administered by the Army and its commanders were responsible for the functioning of MEA units within their areas.

#### **Defense of civil community and its effect upon the size of the Government forces**

From the first the Government was confronted by the ugly fact that its mission had two aspects. It must protect the civil power and population so that the economy could continue to function, and it must destroy the bandit forces. But the bandit forces could be engaged and destroyed only by aggressive pursuit and, in the absence of any instrumentality other than the Gendarmerie for civil defense, the employment of the major portion of



the Army in such operations would have left the civil community without direct protection. After its first more or less fruitless series of offensive operations in 1947, the Army succumbed to political pressures to make static dispositions of troops for the protection of the civil community. This defensive mission was a bottomless pit which long absorbed much of the Army's capacity for more productive undertakings.

Eventually this highly unsatisfactory situation was alleviated by the formation of the National Defense Corps and by the arming of civilians. Thus, by an increase in Government forces of 50,000 for local defense purposes and by utilizing to some extent the capacity of communities to protect themselves, more profitable employment of the Army became practicable.

The question may be raised as to whether action could not have been taken before the war was a year-and-a-half old to organize a civil defense that could have stood up to irregular warfare without the Army assuming direct responsibility for it. A civil defense able to function with a minimum of assistance from the Army would have permitted the latter to concentrate on its other mission—that of seeking out and destroying the guerrillas.

The question also arises as to what might have happened if the danger to the civil community had been accepted as a calculated risk while the Army went ahead with offensive operations. Had this been done, it is probable that the war would have ended earlier and that the total damage to the civil community would have been less than was actually sustained.

#### **Economic aspects of the strength of the Government forces**

Perhaps the best countermeasure to the guerrillas would have been a strong economy, but the existing economy was so weak that its collapse could be avoided only through relief and rehabilitation. The drachma budget was limited and appropriations under the U. S. aid program were not unlimited. Concentration of all available resources on the military program might well have resulted in collapse of the economy which, after all, was the primary target of the guerrillas. It was

necessary, therefore, in the allocation of funds, to steer a nice course between the Charybdis of military weakness and the Scylla of economic weakness. In fact, the military estimates were always exceeded which resulted in reductions in the funds available for reconstruction. Economic recovery was delayed thereby, but sufficient relief was provided to forestall outright collapse on the economic front.

It is evident that careful consideration had to be given to the size of the armed forces. The Greek authorities, particularly the military, tended to disregard this and to press for increases in the strength of the Army. If the Army was to have sole responsibility for the protection of the civil community, many more troops could have been employed in garrison duty. There was, however, a limit to the number of troops which could be employed profitably in offensive operations. Some think that the strength ultimately arrived at through progressive increases was greater than needed—"like using a sledgehammer to kill a fly." However, both the British Military Mission and the Greek Government at the end of the 1948 campaign advocated further increases. In opposing this view the U. S. Mission took the position that the forces as then constituted were adequate to cope with the guerrilla menace provided they were properly trained, employed and led. Its objective was to increase the effectiveness of the Army rather than to increase its size. In view of the judgment of history, the soundness of this position can scarcely be questioned.

Though it will now be agreed that the forces employed by the Government were adequate in strength, there remain the theoretical arguments as to whether the forces might not have been even smaller, if the problem of civil defense had been handled differently, if the combat forces had been differently employed, or if they had been differently constituted.

#### **Summary**

The great disparity in numerical strength between Government forces and guerrilla fighters is shown in the following tabulation, which represents the approximate status as of the month of July 1949:

#### *Government Forces*

Greek National Army.....	150,000
National Defense Corps.....	50,000
Gendarmerie .....	25,000
Civil Police .....	7,500
Civilian components .....	?
	<hr/> 232,500

#### *"Democratic Army"*

With bands in Greece.....	18,000
Guerrillas in satellites .....	10,000
Collaborators .....	?
Satellite personnel .....	?
	<hr/> 28,000

This great numerical disparity between the combat personnel of the two sides was the basic factor in establishing the relative strengths and weaknesses of the combat elements of opposing sides. It was the magnitude of this difference which defined the strategic and tactical patterns of the war—patterns which tended to minimize any direct relationship between the armed strength of the contestants.

A significant relationship between the numbers of combatants did exist, however. As Government forces were increased by the formation of the National Defense Corps, the Army was able to concentrate and employ large formations in offensive operations. These resulted in more casualties among the guerrillas. At the same time recruiting was rendered more difficult. Increased casualties and decreased recruiting over a long period could have but one result. The numerical strength of the guerrillas was being reduced progressively for a period of six months prior to its collapse. Assuming that this reduction resulted from the more extensive operations of the Army, rather than a decision by the guerrilla leaders to limit the scope of operations because of Yugoslavia's diminishing support, this trend must have weighed heavily in the Communist decision to cease military operations. Another factor, the importance of which can scarcely be over-estimated in connection with this decision, was the loss of one-third of the effective strength of the guerrillas by Tito's closing of the Yugoslav-Greek border on 10 July 1949. USMC

(To be continued next month)





♦ YOU CAN HARDLY TURN A TELEVISION set on today without running into a giveaway program of some sort and now it seems that the Marine Corps is attempting to embark on one itself with its current re-enlistment campaign.

Our recruiting and re-enlistment outlook for the next 12 months seems pretty grim all right, but I

don't think the present program gives the answer to our procurement problems.

The type of individual who is induced to enlist or re-enlist by the vague promise of an indefinite tour of duty in an unnamed duty station is often unstable. And while his re-enlistment may make the charts and graphs look good for the next year,

that man is a potential malcontent. If he lives to be a hundred he will never tire of telling how the Marine Corps tricked him and wouldn't let him spend his second cruise at the little Naval station about two blocks from his mother's front door.

Prospective recruits, who are always ready to listen to sea stories anyway, won't deduct the 90 percent

"bull" from the griper's commentary and they probably won't realize that the griper was the one who deceived himself all the way down the line.

Naturally, there will be some exceptions but this sort of campaign has made us enemies in the past. Remember the "two-year enlistment for aviation duty only?" They flocked to the recruiting offices in droves on that one. Then after they got in a lot of them found they didn't like aviation duty and wanted to get in the FMF or some other branch. Then they found they were stuck in aviation and they honked long and loud.

In addition to the "aviation duty only" program I have seen the ef-


makes a good career Marine and a top-notch combatant.

Now we have a picture of our ideal career Marine. It's obvious that we can't change the age, health, appearance and age factors very much. If a man doesn't have these qualifications, he just won't fill the bill and we can't do much about it. But we can do something about his finding a "home" in the Corps—we can influence the factors that make him like or dislike the outfit.

Let's look at it this way—when a man has a full belly, cigarettes to smoke, clothes to wear and a place to sleep he can afford to dream. It is seldom that he is decided one way or another about re-enlistment—his whole attitude is generally based on

every trivial grievance they can to justify their full acceptance of complete separation from the service. Most of these grievances are absolutely ridiculous. "Reveille is too early," they whine, or "liberty starts too late." In addition, of course, there is that jewel of the ages, "the sergeant has it in for me."

But brushing these ridiculous gripes aside, let's run over a few grievances I have heard from time to time which have made me pause and think. If these gripes are legitimate then we all know we must make every effort to eliminate them. Pre-supposing that these problems do exist, I am listing them along with a solution on how to handle them. Here they are:



fects of two other "giveaway" enlistment and re-enlistment programs since 1945. None of them really succeeded and for awhile I thought we had learned our lesson.

What, then, can we do? How can we get the right kind of men to re-enlist, and thus keep the nucleus of our present organization? To begin with, let's analyze the type of individual we would like to have with us as a career Marine.

The ideal man should be from 17 to 30 years of age, reasonably healthy, of average physique and appearance and he should have nine years or more of formal schooling. We might add one more factor here—he should be the type of man who has found a "home" in the Corps, one who likes the life. The records will show that our composite man

his opinion of the immediate environment. Simply stated, he is either going to stay in the Corps because he likes it, or something has caused him not to like it and he is going to try the great USS *Outside*.

Perhaps for him (and maybe for the Corps, too) the change will be a good thing, but deep down inside he knows that he is about to trade a positive retirement at 40 years of age with better than \$100.00 per month, for a dubious retirement at about age 65 with perhaps half that amount. His attitude is invariably cynical, but few have fooled me with it. Experience has convinced me that the first re-enlistment is one of the most momentous decisions the average man makes in his lifetime.

To some men a discharge becomes an obsession and they muster up

*I am ashamed of the appearance of my fellow Marines both on liberty and while on an off-duty status.* Solution: Bring back the snap and polish that has always identified Marines on and off duty. Put mirrors at every liberty gate, hold inspection on every man going ashore and provide a truck to take every sloppy looking individual back to his unit. Above all—no blue jeans! Encourage the wearing of the dress blue uniform (by all ranks) and teach them how to wear it. A neat Marine on a normal liberty in blues is our most effective advertisement. Hands in pockets, open clothing, dirty clothing, long hair and unshined shoes are all problems which can and must be eliminated by vigilance on the part of NCOs at the very lowest echelons—this is serious!



An NCO no longer has privileges commensurate with his rank. This is the tale of woe I've heard too long and too often—the NCO should get more privileges like in the "Old Corps." Well, well. Long ago I came to the conclusion that the Old Corps ain't what it used to be and never was. When the new corporal sews on his stripes and wets them down with his old private and Pfc buddies he should make that his farewell party. Sure, I'll admit that in the old days when a man wore as many hash marks as he had stripes, the average NCO knew more about the Corps and leadership than the man who makes it in a year or less today. But think of the problems the old-timer had. Think of how many private and Pfc buddies he acquired during all that time and had to leave behind on the assumption of his new rank. So let's stop leaning so heavily on the technical sergeant and make the corporal assume his authority even if the authority extends over only one Pfc. When he has demonstrated his ability as an NCO he will automatically get his privileges. By his very performance of duty he will make his own privileges. But so long as we wait for him to make the break himself he will insist on being one of



... and properly served?

the boys (so he won't hurt their feelings) and naturally he will be treated as an individual too friendly with his subordinates to be trusted. That man rates no privileges.

I'm tired of living in a tent. A tent can be a very pleasant place to live . . . if it doesn't leak, if it isn't crowded and if it doesn't alternate between a haze of dust and a sea of mud. Above all, space and adequate security must be furnished for personal effects and individual equip-

ment. Needless to say, these ideal conditions do not always prevail.

The chow is lousy. Chow will improve anywhere when both the officer of the day and the sergeant of the guard slip into the middle of every mess formation and eat with the troops.

I wish it were easier to have my family with me. The housing problem is always a stickler; its procurement may be a high-level headache, its administration political and its construction a nightmare of compromise with everyone from labor unions to local chambers of commerce. Local authority can't do much about building more housing, so we will deal here only with how the situation will finally affect Marines.

We Marines take pride in our consideration for the rights and dignities of the individual and no other service can say they do any better, but our considerations for him must not stop with his duty problems. We know that housing near any large military installation is inevitably inadequate. And while we are aware that honest efforts are being made to alleviate these conditions, long-range plans should be more clearly promulgated to the individual who will be most interested—the potential career Marine.

Now for the billeting system. Though it may seem democratic for a major to live in one end of a set of quarters and a private to occupy the other end with his brood, it sure raises hell with discipline, especially when they both are in the same car pool—familiarity breeds contempt, whether real or imaginary.

In addition, a man who is weighing a future in the Corps against a civilian career may find it hard to believe that there is a future if he sees a major faring no better than himself. There are other factors—suppose the major has a hellion of a kid who causes damage to the private's property. Decency dictates that the major apologize for his offspring's conduct. Then suppose again that the same private comes up before the major several days later for disciplinary action? It won't work out. No officer or staff NCO should ever be placed in the position where he must apologize to a private.

On the other hand, look at the



"I'm tired of living in a tent"



situation from the private's point of view. Shall the private's wife apologize, or get an inferiority complex, because her clothes or household furnishings are not on a par with those of the major's family?

So it goes. I know the situation is under study and it eventually will be squared away, but let's publicize the squaring-away process. Our family lives (officers, staff NCOs and lower-rated men) should be spent in three distinct and separate sets of living quarters.

undecided about shipping over until they were turned over to a casual company or a separation center. In many cases the treatment given them during this period decided them against re-enlisting.

Once a man transfers to a casual company or a separation center we should not consider him a sheep lost to the fold. As the day approaches for him to receive his discharge he comes closer to making his final decision. We should do everything we can at this point to insure that his

should be on board for personal problems.

Every convenience should be available in the separation barracks. The reading rooms should be well stocked with pamphlets and attractive literature on the advantages of continued service. And most important — these men should be authorized liberty every minute their presence is not absolutely required.

This is our Corps. Forget about the Old Corps and long tirades on why we should re-adopt obsolete



**Gripe No. 1409: "Too hard to reach the gate"**

It is too hard to reach the gate to go on liberty. Why should it be so hard to get to a liberty area from some of our larger posts and stations? Too often the man going on liberty is faced with inadequate bus schedules and standing-room-only. It's either that, or bandits in taxicabs clean him of his cash on the way into town or "roll" him on the way back. Shuttle-busses are the answer to this one.

**Why FMF U.S. after FMF Korea?** The man returning from combat rates a tour of duty outside the FMF even if it means cutting down the tour of duty for all hands at certain security installations. Some Marines are content to perform all of their service in the FMF, but others would like to see a little of other types of duty available in the Corps. This curiosity should be satisfied.

All these gripes I mentioned, real or imaginary, may prevent Marines from shipping over. But there have been cases where men were actually

decision will be in the Corps' favor.

In the never-ending effort to get a clear picture of the situation for the higher echelons, the lower echelons are burdened with complicated forms, reports and lengthy directives. The very people who should be taking care of the needs of the re-enlistment prospect are compelled to neglect him so that the reports can be digested and accomplished. In other words, rather than trying to satisfy the prospect, all efforts go into the task of satisfying the office demanding the reports. And another thing, re-enlistment sales talks should be handled by an "old hand," not by some first-cruise NCO whose constant chatter is about how anxious he is to see the day his own service is terminated. These potential career Marines should not be worked while they are being processed, neither should they be subjected to boring lectures on re-enlistment or their rights as a veteran. However, a trained consultant

items of clothing like the campaign hat and the high-top dress shoe. In their place let's have some real hot discussions on methods of instilling pride in a Marine. The recent order giving the Marine back his rifle is a step in the right direction — let's have more like it.



Pride is still our pivot, and fundamentals are our problems. Our minor disciplinary problems are in direct proportion to the number of privates with their hands in their pockets who pass my fellow NCOs daily and go their merry way without a rebuke. The individual who side-steps regulations has the least respect for the person who allows him to get away with it.

This is not a plea for a "get tough" policy, but rather for a Corps-wide return to uniformity. Keep the man informed, take care of his problems quickly, instill pride in him, give him some reasonable assurance of fair treatment and that man will ship over.

US MC



# OF MORTARS



MARINE CORPS

1st Prize



(field officers & civilians)

PRIZE ESSAY CONTEST

ASSOCIATION



# AND MEN

By LtCol J. J. Wade, Jr.

**Are we hanging on to our mortars for sentimental reasons?**

IF THE SEVERAL REQUISITES FOR success in amphibious attack were condensed to a single criterion, the most appropriate standard would be economy — not a penny-wise frugality, but an optimum provision of adequate resources. Availability of amphibious shipping dictates that the landing force consist solely of mandatory elements. There can be no duplication of effort with respect to men or materiel, nor to operational or logistical functions.

The Marine Corps has recently combed its tables of organization to achieve maximum economy of manpower, stripping down wherever possible, and logistic and service units have been overhauled with a view toward ensuring adequate support for combat elements.

The Marine Corps' weapons system remains to be measured by the yardstick of economy. Does it preclude any duplication of effort among organic and supporting arms? Is it capable of utmost flexibility, through maneuverability of fire and the capacity for centralized control, when battlefield conditions so dictate? Does it permit a tactical commander to handle the minimum

number of subordinate elements — and without the necessity for introducing intermediate echelons for control? Does it lend itself to simplification of logistics for assault unit commanders?

Examination indicates the sizable mortar structure of the infantry regiment may be a suitable element for measurement by the economy yardstick. The 569 officers and men specifically designated as mortar personnel constitute 15 percent of the regiment's strength.

In terms of sheer manpower, how could a regimental commander most profitably employ these 569 personnel? Their continued employment as mortarmen must, of course, be considered. Hypothetically, however, he might organize a fourth infantry battalion at two-thirds strength without further augmentation. Or he might add one rifle company, at 90 percent strength, to each battalion. He could augment each rifle platoon with a fourth squad and still have upward of 200 personnel capable of manning additional anti-tank weapons. Their employment must ultimately be determined by the relative value of the infantry mortar.

There exists the possibility of duplication of effort which stems principally from the mortar's indirect method of fire. Observers from 60mm, 81mm and 4.2-inch mortar units search for targets in areas covered by forward observers from direct support artillery battalions. Such overlapping of observation is obviously uneconomical. It cannot be denied that an advantage lies in having the maximum number of observers scan possible trouble spots. Yet when two observers seek the best vantage point within the relatively limited confines of the company zone, survey the same hostile activity with a common field of observation and finally call (probably simultaneously) for attack by indirect-fire weapons, there exists a manifest duplication of effort. If there be sufficient difference in effect on the target between mortar fire and artillery fire, a single observer party with dual communications should be capable of immediate selection of weapon and accomplishment of the fire mission.

Might not such a trained observer, doubling in mortars and artillery, be on occasion hard pressed to de-



cide the better weapon? If the target were beyond mortar range he would have no problem. Within the limited range of the mortar, however, he would be forced to consider the similarity in type of projectiles in fuze action, as well as in effect on the target. He could attack a soft target in the open with either weapon. His first choice for a target in the defile of a reverse slope would probably be the mortar, unless he were familiar with the technique of high-angle artillery fire. Being trained in this respect, however, he is aware that the elevation of the artillery piece beyond 45 degrees transforms it immediately into a long-range mortar without interfering with its capacity for mass concentration of firepower.

This plight of the forward observer suggests that a two-fold duplication exists—first, in forward observation parties, and second, in effect on the target. A study of trajectory diagrams discloses that there is no conceivable mortar target which cannot be reached by all present Fleet Marine Force artillery-cannon

of mortar ammunition is accompanied by far more sweat en route to the pit than a tenfold quantity of artillery rounds. A basic humanitarian instinct will tip the balance in favor of field artillery.

Besides these indications of duplication of effort, how does the infantry mortar measure up in terms of remaining indices of the economy yardstick?

It is perhaps unfair to judge the mortar in terms of flexibility. A given mortar, or mortar section, can maneuver its fire freely within its range capability. Only within the artillery-type organization of the regimental 4.2-inch mortars, however, can mortar fires be massed to a limited extent, or maneuvered in such mass concentration under a centralized fire direction center. No advantage would accrue from augmentation of 60mm or 81mm mortar elements by technical personnel and equipment, since their inherent range limitations preclude effective massing of fire while in normal combat disposition. Hence, in terms of flexibility only the 4.2-inch mortar

his mortar units. Being the only indirect fire weapon in the infantry family, his mortars breed peculiar problems which have nothing in common with those of his remaining elements. Whether in training or in the heat of combat, he faces two inescapable facts—he will be perpetually short of time, and he must dole out a fixed portion of what he has to his mortars.

How would the logistician wield the economy yardstick? The back-breaking problems of ammunition supply do not stop at the Class V dump at which the mortar personnel load their vests and hand carts. A vast host of supply and service personnel must ensure perpetuation of "impetus from rear to front." Mortars account for a fair share of the communication equipment within the regiment, as well as for the related logistical problems.

In sum, the mortar fails to reveal itself as a paragon of economy. It must be borne in mind that the question of desirability is a secondary consideration. In today's militant austerity, the Marine Corps faces the problem of identifying those organic elements which are least economical in the execution of its primary amphibious mission. As new and radically different weapons become acceptable, those which have been so identified will be the most likely to be retired from the system.

The history of the mortar sheds some additional light on its current value. Among the earliest identifiable weapons of this type was the Coehorn mortar, employed in 18th century siege operations. After lying dormant for 200 years, the mortar re-appeared in World War I, first in the form of the German Krupp Minenwerfer, and later in the British Stokes trench mortar. Thus, a war of position, with both forces well entrenched, gave rise to the re-birth of the weapon.

The inadequacy of World War I field artillery fostered the acceptance of the mortar during that period. The fire of a single battery could be adjusted on a target of opportunity by the battery commander, employing devious rules of thumb as well as complicated mathematical procedures. Communication, observation and liaison with supported infantry were rudimentary at best. Such shortcomings precluded any attempt



*Not enough hills for all the FOs*

(with the sole exception of the Class IV 75mm pack howitzer, which lacks the capability of firing at high angle).

The observer's dilemma does not seem incapable of solution to his practical mind. He realizes his supported infantry is chronically short of trucks. He knows that each round

appears to have an economical capacity for massed and mutual support.

At each echelon within the infantry, from rifle company to regiment, the commander has a direct concern with the health, welfare, state of training, supply and communication, as well as every combat activity of



**WW I Krupp Minenwerfer**

to maneuver massed fires of batteries or battalions, a process perfected within the framework of the centralized fire direction technique of World War II.

Supporting fires in the attack were planned and executed with the rigidity of a railroad timetable. Once under way, the rolling barrage moved on an inexorable schedule. The rate of progress of assault infantry was geared to the successive lifting of the curtain of fire. More often than not, infantry watched their inflexible supporting fires move beyond effective range while they were pinned down. It is understandable that they developed a reliance on their organic mortars to overcome the deficiencies in their awkward artillery support.

The direct support artillery weapon itself left much to be desired. The venerable "French 75" was a high-velocity, flat-trajectory gun, possessing none of the advantages of today's light howitzer. Troops in trenches were relatively immune to its low-angle fire. The murderous air burst of today above open emplacements was then unknown. The closest approach was the shrapnel projectile, a container filled with metal balls which were expelled forward by a base charge which was in turn activated by a time fuze.

The major difficulty was the fact that the shrapnel, together with the shell, continued along the original flat trajectory. Vertical effect or side spray, which might reach down into uncovered trenches, was totally lacking.

It is little cause for wonder then, that both forces resurrected the long forgotten mortar as a means of lobbing effective fire into enemy emplacements. It was precisely this situation which led to its World War I title of "trench mortar."

The mortar has tenaciously clung to this position of specialized popularity through 35 years of advances in the field of supporting arms. Aviation has come of age as a close support weapon. The development transition of field artillery has been less spectacular, but no less effective. Provision of a fire direction center in each artillery echelon permits the massing of fire of every cannon in the landing force on lucrative targets of opportunity. Range and zone of fire have been significantly increased for each type of artillery liaison teams, and nine forward observer teams are available for assignment to each supported infantry regiment. Artillery can now effectively attack the prime mortar target (personnel in defilade) by high angle fire, or by conventional trajectory weapons employing VT fuze.

The post-World War II establishment of an effective fire support coordination center in major landing force echelons, together with related supporting arms centers within infantry regiments and battalions, has markedly reduced the justification for organic indirect fire weapons within supported units. The infantry commander now has a choice of assigning a fire mission to his fire support co-ordinator or to his mortar officer. If the target lies within mortar range he will, in all probability, hesitate to assign it to those mortars unless ammunition is on the position in plentiful supply. That, in effect, is a summary of doctrine by which the fire support co-ordinator would be guided if the decision were passed to him for resolution. Such lack of definitive guidance is evidence of the duplication of target effect between mortars and supporting weapons.

Today's infantry commander would undoubtedly be most reluc-

tant to concur in this cold-blooded analysis of one of his primary weapons. His reluctance would probably be based on his dependence on the mortars as his ace in the hole should he not receive adequate artillery support. The means are available, however, to ensure proper and sufficient supporting fire within the landing force. From the moment the 105mm howitzer unit is assigned in direct support of an infantry regiment, requests for fire from infantry commanders assume automatic priority over those from any other source, except as authorized by the division commander. Such exceptions are specified only in unusual circumstances.

What effect would an economical reduction of mortars have on the infantry commander? To ensure adequate and continuous fire support, he would necessarily exploit the full capabilities of his artillery liaison officers and forward observers. The infantryman who has properly utilized them in the past is the man who would miss his mortars the least.

Without mortars, his ammunition resupply problem would be greatly simplified. He would deal with a lesser number of subordinates in the

***Its malfunctions are hidden in the confusion of battle***



preparation and issuance of orders. Communication difficulties would be curtailed. Planning of supporting fires would be more readily accomplished in absence of the necessity for co-ordination with the problematical mortars. He would certainly not be hard pressed to find profitable employment for the resultant manpower saving.

The infantry commander's de-

ress made by the Marine Corps in strengthening this weak link in the direct support artillery chain. He explains his thesis that the new LVTH-6 must be considered as self-propelled amphibious artillery by virtue of increased speed, mechanical reliability and improved gun capability.

The ultimate result will be that the forward observer and artillery

the minimum range line. In contrast, the smaller objective precludes such rearward emplacement of artillery.

The problem is not incapable of solution. Nor does a feasible solution dictate perpetuation of the infantry commander's mortar burden. The mechanical and technical details were largely resolved some years ago when the 81mm mortar was



*High-angle fire only . . .*

pendence on his mortars in the early critical stages of an amphibious operation has not been without a sound basis. Throughout World War II, it was evident that artillery was most impotent in the period when assaulting infantry elements suffered the most dire need for it. (During establishment of that crucial toe-hold on a hostile shore.) Artillery liaison parties and forward observers would have accompanied infantry in their slow and costly progress inland. Meanwhile gun crews cursed and inched their unwieldy howitzers into landing craft, or impatiently sweated it out beyond the line of departure, unproductively waiting, "on call."

Mortars closed the breach within the limitations imposed by the uncertainty of their own ammunition supply. They did provide indirect fire on targets protected from other infantry weapons, or on those inaccessible to aircraft or fire support ships.

LtCol Victor J. Croizat's *Amphibian with a Future*, in the February 1953 GAZETTE, discloses prog-

liaison wire lines will not terminate with an expectant but ineffectual firing battery guide at the beach. Rather, these communications will be capable of linking first-wave artillery elements, in position and ready to fire, with assault infantry immediately upon reorganization after their dismounting from LVT personnel carriers. Thus, the infantry-artillery team will arrive as a combat-ready unit.

This significant stride toward assurance of immediate, effective and continuous artillery support further emphasizes the fact that the infantry mortar is superfluous in the normal amphibious mission of the Marine Corps.

It may well be argued that an amphibious assault on a limited objective may sustain the requirement for mortars. The minimum range of direct support artillery exceeds that of the mortar. In operations of normal extent and breadth, the problem is insignificant, since artillery may be emplaced sufficiently far in rear of assault elements to ensure that all close support fires will fall beyond

mounted on the M32 series tank recovery vehicle.

With a modicum of engineering, the barrel assembly and standard of the 4.2-inch mortar could be readily adapted to mounting on the upper surface of the opened ramp of the LVTH-6, without interfering with the functioning of its normal armament. In the interval after cessation of the LVTH-6 role of direct fire, and prior to infantry's gaining the ground equivalent to 105mm minimum range, the armored amphibian crew could man the 4.2-inch mortar. Fire missions needed by infantry would be adjusted by direct support artillery observers through the

*The "105" . . .*



LVTH-6 fire direction center. With the resultant guarantee of early as well as continuous artillery support, the infantryman's desperate grip on his organic mortar would tend to relax.

The mortar has long taken understandable refuge from the cold and remorseless light of fact. Those Marines who recite first-hand, or sometimes third-hand, reports of

ability of the 81mm mortar. The 2d Marine Division reported on 13 June that six rounds impacted 200 to 500 yards short while executing a fire mission at a range of 2,000 yards. Eight days later, the 2d Marine Division reported that two or three rounds fell short while firing at 1,100 yards range.

In a subsequent test of this particular lot of 81mm ammunition, 19 of 106 rounds fired proved grossly erratic. On 10 July, the Training and Replacement Command, Camp Pendleton, reported a premature burst 20 feet above the muzzle. On 12 July, the 2d Marine Division reported five rounds which fell from 200 to 500 yards short of the computed range of 2,000 yards.

It must be admitted that this 30-day period was not chosen at random. Although not typical, it points up the necessity for examination of the trust which has been habitually placed in the mortar.

Logical humanitarian reasons prompted the immediate ban imposed by the Marine Corps on over-



support artillery, it surpasses justification.

The mortar, as well as its projectile, possesses inherent ballistic deficiencies. The mortarman who carried an 81mm tube in his struggle to the top of a Korean ridge would affirm that it was sturdy, stout and uncomfortably rigid. Yet the forces incident to firing yield a measurable and inconsistent whip in the tube. The fact that he could carry it at all results from the compromise between requisite ballistic rigidity and portability.

The relatively loose fit of 60mm and 81mm projectiles in the smooth bore causes an inequitable distribution of force. In the absence of rifling and a rotating band there can be no effective seal of propelling gas. Since gravity forces the shell to the lower side of the tube, at ignition the escaping gas cannot flow around the shell in a balanced stream. In-



... flat-trajectory fire only

outstanding feats of mortar gunnery are prone to dismiss too lightly the evidence of that weapon's treachery. Duly recorded over the years have been the numerous reports of malfunctions of mortars in training exercises employing live ammunition. Punctuating these ample volumes are those incidents which have resulted in death or serious injury. It must be surmised that mortar malfunctions increase proportionally in combat, although they tend to remain hidden in the confusion of battle.

An examination of malfunction reports covering a 30-day period in 1951 illustrates the lack of depend-

ability of the 81mm and 60mm mortars in training exercises. The fact remains that the mortar is still capable of causing unjustifiable casualties to friendly elements in combat. Risk is an inseparable component of battle. When that risk, however, is augmented by an uneconomical weapon which must be considered superfluous in the presence of direct

fire, its tendency is to continue to keep the shell off center.

After the interaction of tube whip and off-center travel has initiated yaw in the projectile, the dissipation of propelling gas, still unequalized through lack of an effective seal, yields a final unpredictable thrust at the fins as they clear the muzzle. An experienced mortar gunner with 20-

20 vision will recall the erratic flight of shells on which these unbalanced forces have failed to accomplish mutual cancellation.

The 4.2-inch mortar obviously does not share all these deficiencies with its smooth-bore counterparts. The heavier tube is less flexible. The rifling itself tends to add a measure of rigidity. The rotating band provides an effective gas seal. The absence of fins negates the third deficiency of the lighter weapons.

The inevitable transition from weapon to counter-measure has consumed more than 30 years in overtaking the World War I mortar. Heretofore that mortar has been relatively immune to detection. By judicious exploitation of defilade, even in close proximity to hostile elements, it has succeeded in remaining elusive. Its relatively low muzzle blast has not simplified the problem of location by sound or flash ranging methods.

The advent of the counter-mortar radar, however, will profoundly alter the mortar's current advantage. The lobbing trajectory of the low-velocity shell is a prime target for such an electronic device. The trace of its high arc will point out the mortar position to the operator almost as vividly as a rainbow. Such radar application will tend to terminate, through accelerated combat attrition, the borrowed time on which the mortar has prolonged its existence. Since the logical counter-weapon is now at hand, an orderly plan for voluntary disposal might well prove preferable to the alternative prospect of having them systematically blown off the beachhead by electronically controlled counterfire.

In recapitulation of the foregoing analysis, factual examination indicates the infantry mortar possesses critical shortcomings. It is an uneconomical appendage to assault elements. It has proven itself a treacherous tool in training as well as in combat. It has been engineered on a ballistically unsound basis. Its life expectancy in combat is subject to drastic curtailment in the foreseeable future.

The infantryman's regard for his mortars would make their abandonment no less difficult than theartil-



**81mm — radar  
can track the  
shell's flight**

leryman's loss in 1945 of his revered 75mm pack howitzer. Veterans of the bloody defense of Edson's Ridge on Guadalcanal will bear witness that no other supporting weapon has ever been able to match it in terms of rapidity of fire, accuracy and literal close support. The fact that the pack howitzer is still retained in Class IV status for possible employment in special operations may provide a reasonable precedent for future application to mortars. Their assignment to Class IV supplies would assure their availability for training or operational use when required.

The net saving resulting from such transfer would amount to a total of 1,707 personnel in the Marine division.

If a gradual transition toward the goal of economy would appear more desirable, the 60mm mortar alone might be transferred to Class IV status, with a saving of 540 personnel. Should such a trial indicate the wisdom of further reduction, a subsequent saving of 747 personnel could be realized upon assignment of the 81mm to Class IV.

An obvious compromise suggests itself on the occasion of the 81mm transfer. The 4.2-inch mortar company might well be increased from two to three platoons. Greater flexibility would be insured in that all 4.2-inch mortars could function with field artillery technique of centralized fire direction, or, at the discretion of the regimental commander, one platoon might be attached to

each infantry battalion in a rapidly moving situation.

The decision concerning retention or retirement of the mortar can only be approached in a completely objective manner. It must be examined with a sharply critical eye on its own efficacy as well as its relation to other supporting weapons. The only valid units of measure on the economy yardstick are the mortar's own intrinsic merits.

In the absence of such an objective approach, sentiment is likely to overrule economy as the measure of value. Sentiment played a most important role in the uncertain transition to the M1 rifle at the outset of World War II. Despite conclusive evidence of the serviceability of the Garand, the Marine Corps was hesitant to relinquish its beloved Springfield. No such maudlin view affected the decision to eliminate the relatively short-lived caliber .30 carbine from the Fleet Marine Force after it failed to withstand the rigors of combat in Korea. It would appear that the older the weapon, the greater is the inertia of sentimental regard in which it basks.

The mortar question can be resolved only on the basis of irrefutable facts. It is potent but uneconomical. It is portable but ballistically deficient. It enjoys an aura of high esteem despite its recorded years of treacherous malfunction. Its future is at the mercy of its electronic counter-weapon and the solution is but a matter of identification — "friend or foe?"

US & MC



# KOREA AWARDS



## Navy Cross

2dLt Philip J. Burr, SSgt William B. Chain, Jr., 2dLt David L. Hyde, Pfc Francis R. Thomas, Jr., TSgt Wilmot H. Wolf.

## Silver Star

2dLt John L. Babson, Jr., Sgt Edwin H. Breaux, Cpl Francis A. Brennan, 2dLt Donald C. Colburn, Pfc Billy R. Cullum, Capt Stanley D. Curyea, Cpl Marvin J. Dennis, SSgt Antone J. Dias, Pvt Melvin P. Gamache, Capt Harold Z. Gray, Capt Malcolm A. Hill, Cpl Charles R. Hyde, Pfc Edward F. Lamers, Pfc Charles W. Lee, Sgt Page L. Keith, Pfc Henry J. Magolan, Pfc Oliver G. Martinez.

WO Sandy L. McLeod, Cpl Richard L. Mechanic, 2dLt Ernest O. Northcutt, Jr., Pfc William Perry, Pfc Leroy T. Pope, Capt Edgar F. Remington, Cpl Lewis M. Sims, Pfc Kenneth L. Thompson, Pfc William C. Verner, Pfc Eugene F. Voss, MSgt Richard R. Vottero, Capt Charles M. Wallace, Jr., Cpl William L. Warner, Capt Alexander Watson, Cpl Donald P. Willett, Pfc Clifford L. Young (2d), SSgt Dushan J. Zobenica.

## Legion of Merit

LtCol William E. Abblitt, Col Owen A. Chambers, Maj Ardell Ebel, LtCol Earl W. Gardner, LtCol Louis C. Griffin, LtCol Richard M. Huizenga, LtCol Henry G. Lawrence, Jr., LtCol Frank A. Long, Col James E. Mills, Col Wallace N. Nelson, LtCol Jonas M. Platt, Maj Thomas L. Randall, LtCol Alvin S. Sanders, Capt Wilbur F. Simlik.

## Distinguished Flying Cross

Maj Gordon L. Allen (4th), Maj Thomas E. Archer, 1stLt Karl Aron, LtCol George C. Axtell, Jr. (2d), 2dLt Jesse "F" Baird, 2dLt Charles E. Baker, 1stLt Leonard C. Balcom, Capt Robert O. Barnum, LtCol Walter R. Bartosh (3d), Maj John D. Beck, LtCol Graham H. Benson (2d), Maj Paul "F" Bent, LtCol John B. Berteling (2d), Capt William Biehl, Jr., Capt Henry F. Brandon, Maj Richard L. Braun (6th), 1stLt William Q. Brothers, 1stLt Vance E. Brown.

Capt Joseph E. Burns, Capt Roy R. Butler, Jr. (2d), Capt Eugene D. Cameron (3d), Capt Nephi C. Christensen, Capt William B. Clem, LtCol Stoddard G. Cortelyou, 1stLt Thomas H. Davis, III, LtCol James K. Dill (4th), Capt John H. Doering, Jr., Capt James G. Dusenbury, Capt Karl W. Eschle, MSgt Ivan F. Evans, 1stLt Irwin Feher, Capt Dail D. Fine, Maj James G. Fox (3d).

Capt Frank B. Francis, Capt William D. Fries, Maj Donald J. Gehri (2d), Maj Fred J. Gilhuys (2d), Maj. James B. Graves (2d),

Capt Carlton M. Green (3d), Capt Robert D. Green, Capt John S. Grosh, 2dLt Lewis C. Habash, Maj Norman "L" Hamm, 1stLt Robert D. Hatch, 1stLt John F. Heiland, Capt Jerry N. Hendershot, 1stLt Thomas P. Hensler, Jr., 2dLt Charles E. Hollaway, Jr., Maj Marvin K. Hollenbeck (3d).

Capt Ward L. Hooper, 1stLt Paul R. Hunter, Capt Thomas D. Ireland, Capt James D. Ireland, Maj "H" L. Jacobi (3d), Capt Eugene N. James (2d), LtCol Winston E. Jewson (2d), Capt Morris L. Johnson (3d), 1stLt Timothy J. Keane, Jr. (2d), Capt Thomas R. Kelly, Capt Robert King, Jr. (2d), 2dLt William G. Langley, Maj Robert C. Lehnert (2d), 1stLt Frank L. Leister. Capt Thomas M. Lewis.

LtCol John B. Maas, Jr., Capt Walter Maik, 1stLt Paul A. Manning, Capt Lee E. McQuay, LtCol Bernard McShane, Maj George C. Morris, 2dLt Charles C. Newmark, 2dLt Reynold M. Olson, Capt James H. Parciarelli, Maj Mervin B. Porter (4th), 1stLt Robert S. Raisch (2d), Maj George O. Ross, Maj Thomas "J" Ross (5th), Capt Arthur O. Schmagel, MSgt James N. Scott, Capt George E. Smith, Capt Richard J. Smith, Maj Robert T. Thorpe, Capt Lyle V. Tope (2d), Capt Edward G. Usher, Jr., Capt Dale L. Ward, Capt Robert D. Woodbury.

## Navy and Marine Corps Medal

2dLt Robert L. Blalack, Maj James L. Cooper.

## Bronze Star

LtCol Bruno J. Andruska, Maj James A. Appel, Jr., 1stLt Robert A. Applewhite, Capt Henry N. Armstrong, Pfc James H. Ball, Capt Donald R. Bashore, LtCol John B. Berteling (2d), Pfc James D. Bishop, MSgt Elmer J. Bouher, Jr., 1stLt William A. Bridge, Pfc Victor D. Burt, LtCol Wayne M. Cargill, 1stLt Robert L. Christian, Jr., 2dLt John W. Clabaugh, Jr., Pfc Herman M. Coates.

Pfc John J. Comp, Capt Ralph B. Crossman, Pfc Billy R. Cullum, SSgt George R. DeCelis, Sgt Guy DeWolf, Maj Sloan M. Diaz, Sgt James E. Dffenbacher, Cpl Eli DiBiase, Maj Robert L. Dominick, Sgt Chester J. Dragon, SSgt John P. Driver, Pfc Kermit R. Ebling, MSgt Douglas W. Edmondson, Capt Tyler D. Evans, Col Edwin C. Ferguson, Pfc Rudolph R. Gutierrez.

Col Loren E. Haffner (2d), SSgt John W. Hudzietz, Capt Clyde W. Hunter, Capt Ray N. Joens, Cpl Bernice Johnson, Cpl Charles O. Jones, SSgt Wilbur L. Jones, Pfc Teddy P. Kellems, 1stLt Robert A. Kimbrough, III, Capt Casimir C. Ksycowski, TSgt Randall Lawler, 1stLt John J. Lister, Pfc Sammie Locash, SSgt Stanley W. Main, Capt Dan L. Mills.

Maj Kenneth B. Nelson, Cpl Joseph J. Ott, 2dLt Wayne G. Palmer, Cpl Donald H. Paquet, Maj Tom S. Parker, Sgt Olen Parker, Sgt Gregory L. Pearson, 2dLt Eric T. Pederson, Pfc Wayne A. Peters, Sgt Robert J. Phelan, Sgt James R. Ping, Pfc James D. Pinkerton, Cpl Louis P. Plagakis, LtCol Albert H. Potter.

LtCol Spencer H. Pratt, LtCol Daniel S. Pregnall, Pfc Jake T. Ragan, 1stLt Raymond R. Rall, Jr., Cpl Robert E. Reigle, LtCol John N. Rentz, Pfc Hector E. Reyes-Cardona, Capt Paul R. Richardson, LtCol Russell R. Riley, TSgt Salvatore S. Roberto, SSgt Archie L. Robinson, 2dLt Daniel F. Rogers, Pfc James W. Rogers, TSgt Charles P. Romero, Sgt Billy L. Rose, LtCol Carlo A. Rovetta, 2dLt Edgar O. R. Sadler.

Maj Marshall Salvaggio, Capt Adolph G. Schwenk, Capt Paul W. Seabaugh, 1stLt Karle F. Seydel, 2dLt Robert T. Shafer, 1stLt Paul E. Shea, Pfc Raymond J. Simmers, Capt Albert C. Sims, Cpl Morton M. Sirota, Maj Jack R. Sloan, Capt James A. Sloan, Cpl Donald A. Sloan, Pfc James L. Sloan, Cpl Charles E. Skinner, Maj Richard B. Smith, 2dLt Thomas C. Smith, TSgt Frank R. Smith, Cpl Benjamin Smith, Jr., Col Eustace R. Smoak.

Cpl James W. Solomon, Sgt John T. Songer, TSgt William D. Sproule, Cpl Jan Stachowicz, Pfc Robert T. Stahl, 2dLt John H. Stapleton, 2dLt Thomas D. Stephens, Maj Clyde S. Stewart, Capt Howard D. Stewart, Cpl Asa D. Stidger, Sgt Lester D. Stoltzfus, Maj Wilford L. Stone, Pfc Doyle W. Stout, MSgt "A" "W" Stuckey, Maj Walter E. Stuenkel, Pfc George C. Styduhar, Maj John B. Sullivan (2d), 1stLt Walter R. Swindells, Cpl Caesar Sylvester.

Sgt Bobby A. Templeton, SSgt Robert J. Thornton, Pfc Arnold R. Tobias, Cpl Charles E. Tobola, TSgt Robert L. Towery, 1stLt Richard G. Troy, Maj Thomas T. Tulipane, SSgt Keith Tullos, Maj Robert H. Twisdale, 1stLt David M. Twomey, Sgt James L. Van Gundy, III.





# 語言非障礙



Though they spoke another tongue, our basic principles of instruction proved valid and we found . . .

**LANGUAGE NO BARRIER**



“FOULED UP LIKE A CHINESE FIRE drill” is an expression familiar to many Marines—but just how fouled up is a Chinese fire drill? How do we know that the Chinese are not capable of executing smooth, efficient drills for any emergency, and are we sure that their military tactics are not the equal of, or better than ours?

These were a few of the questions that officer-members of the Troop Training Team, Amphibious Group Western Pacific were asking each other early in 1952 when they were given the mission of training the Chinese Nationalist Marine Corps.

Was the analogy to be drawn “fouled up like Chinese amphibious warfare,” or would it be possible to teach Chinese Marines the complicated details of an amphibious landing?

Our first step was to re-write lectures which had originally been made up to instruct U. S. Marine and Army regimental combat teams, and here we were stymied a bit by the time element. A glossary, for instance, was essential to teaching our theories and tactics to Chinese troops, but we didn't have time to complete one before our first period of instruction began. As a result, our earlier lectures were hampered by misunderstandings.

For some of the terminology the simple approach in translating was best, in other cases the simple approach got us in trouble. For example, in searching for a word to designate our DUKW, one interpreter did fairly well by coming up with a phrase which meant “sea-going truck.” Another solved it by merely saying “DUKW.” The third, however, hit upon “Ya-tzu” which is the Chinese word for duck—the barnyard variety.

In another case we heard interpreters talking about something which came out in English as “free boat.” Well, there are such things as free boats in an amphibious landing but in this instance we traced the interpretation back from “free boat” to “freedom boat” to “Liberty Ship” to “AKA”—quite a different meaning had been intended.

The interpreters themselves were of varying abilities. Some had no

military background, others had difficulty with English and some, it turned out, spoke dialects their own countrymen couldn't understand. We ran into all varieties of problems, but after rehearsal of the material most of our interpreters did very well. It took patience and practice, but the success of our mission rested on the grasp an interpreter could obtain of our material.

Handouts which outlined the lectures were employed to great advantage. It was necessary to write them in English, translate them and check them. Translation, it was found, was an entirely different problem from that of interpretation. A large number of translators was needed and their work had to be revised and standardized. This necessitated the appointment of a translator-in-chief with a military background, and it constituted a bottleneck which had not been anticipated during the planning stage of our course.

We had been worried about classroom facilities but we needn't have been. The classrooms were newly built and each student turned up with a tidy bamboo stool and a writing board with an envelope attached for holding maps and handouts. A speaker's rostrum graced the front of each room and it was

shared by the instructor and the interpreter during the lecture periods.

In the actual instruction we used every trick in the book. It was readily apparent in this case, as in all military instruction, that the subjects could be put across better by the use of visual aids, charts, moving pictures and demonstrations rather than by bare, unsupported lectures. In teaching a group of Chinese, this concept of instruction was even more important than in our own instruction at home, since the students had to wait through a presentation of an idea in English before hearing the Chinese version.

The interpreters were quite a help in that their ideas of interpretation did not stop with the spoken word. They responded to an animated, expressive lecturer and would subconsciously mimic the teacher. It was a great aid, as it helped the students in understanding the presentation.

The sand table demonstration of an amphibious landing was received with great enthusiasm and it played to standing-room-only crowds. It was presented at night under lights and was made even more dramatic by the use of well-coordinated sound effects. It created such a sensation we found it necessary to request additional MPs to keep the kids out.

### *Lectures: visual aids helped when words failed*



The English version was given first because it was necessary for our Marines to understand their cues for operating the models and detonating the electrical squibs. We had many requests for repeat performances and it was hard to decide whether the sand table demonstration should come first in the course as an introduction to amphibious warfare, or whether it should come later to aid in clearing up details and summarizing instruction.

The Chinese love a play or a drama and they constitute some of the world's most enthusiastic motion picture fans. Accordingly, we felt that some of our instruction should be conveyed through this medium. The plays and films available were in English, of course, and it was necessary to translate the dialogue and commentary to Chinese. Some of the fine points were lost or confused in the transition but on the whole the plays themselves were entertaining and instructive. At first we used students as actors, but later discovered that a group of professional actors was available. This group was hired and we were thus able to present all-star dramas on logistics, use of supporting arms and amphibious operations.

We possessed good training films but it remained up to the instructors to adapt them to the class. At first we tried running them as they came, but later we decided that to

get full benefit from them we would need a Chinese commentary. Attempts were made, after lengthy rehearsals with interpreters, to cut sound tape recordings which were designed to be synchronized with the film. Unfortunately (probably due to the varying output of current in the electric circuits) we could seldom get the sound track to synchronize with the picture. By this time, however, our interpreters were familiar with their material and so we allowed them to deliver a running lecture over a public address microphone at the same time the training film was being shown with the sound cut out.

It would have been ideal to have been able to reproduce and translate all the charts and graphic aids available, but time considerations made it necessary to screen them and use only the most important ones. The opaque slide projector was used to great advantage here since it was easier and quicker to prepare than a full-sized chart. Translating these visual aids from English to Chinese required first a translator, then a calligrapher or artist. But no great difficulties were encountered. A single Chinese character represents a whole word in English, so our Chinese charts were often more simple than their English counterparts.

There were times when we got too clever for ourselves and our cleverness back-fired. One example was

our preparation of several charts for "black light" projection. The occasion was a presentation on amphibious operations and it was given in a darkened theater. When the luminous lettering suddenly glowed in the dark under the impetus of the special "black light" the Chinese students were taken by surprise. As a result the lecture suffered because the audience was distracted by the method of presentation.

Practical demonstrations also had their day in court. The subject of amphibious reconnaissance was something new to the Chinese and they were very enthusiastic over the idea of using rubber boats for a pre-landing, amphibious reconnaissance. The boats were demonstrated to them and, although the students were not the swimmers they claimed to be, they learned the mechanics of handling rubber boats without difficulty.

Field trips and walk-throughs were two other devices which we would have preferred using more often than we did. A walk-through of the entire ship-to-shore movement was held on a large parade ground and it proved to be a big help to the troops. Later a CPX was held in order to familiarize officers with details of control and communications within the movement. An exercise of this type was essential because the Chinese Marine Corps is equipped with only limited communication facilities and the students were new to our techniques. It was of interest to learn from a Chinese naval officer that his previous amphibious knowledge and training had been picked up from the Japanese. Comparing the two systems *per se*, to say nothing of results, he allowed as how he preferred ours!

But even after the perfect course of instruction has been planned and the very best training aids and devices have been made available, the burden of responsibility for the success of the individual courses rests upon the shoulders of the instructor. Ten different teachers will convey a thought or idea in 10 different ways but there are always certain principles of good instruction to be followed. These facts were made evident by observing the results obtained in instructing the Chinese Marine Corps.

Rehearsal of material is a pre-

*"At times we got too clever for ourselves"*





requisite to an intelligent presentation. Complete familiarity with the subject allows the instructor to speak extemporaneously and with confidence and enthusiasm. It allows the lecturer to meet questions that will occur to the students and answer them in a way that will focus attention on the main parts of the instruction.

An outline of the lecture is essential, and in our case a handout in Chinese frequently was prepared to allow students to refer to it during the lecture and for later study and review.

The familiar precepts in regard to stage presence on the part of the instructor were all the more valid in our case. While working with a Chinese interpreter, distracting habits on the part of the speaker, or lack of poise on the platform were copied by, or conveyed to the interpreter. These bad habits would distract the students' attention while the Chinese version of the lecture was being given. Instructors had to exact high standards of stage presence from their Chinese partners, many of whom were civilians not accustomed to speaking before a military audience.


All good instruction is simple instruction and the teacher working through an interpreter must continually strive to break down complex ideas into simple parts. Our minds ordinarily run faster than our ability to convey ideas orally, and great restraint must be applied by an enthusiastic teacher who may become impatient with even good interpreters. Very often two different languages do not have equivalent expressions and therefore at times an idea cannot be translated accurately or precisely. It calls for patience, understanding and simplicity on the part of the teacher. He cannot be a "nit-picker" and he must avoid using complex sentences with excessive adjectives, adverbs and dependent phrases.

Repetition can serve a purpose but it can also kill student interest. An instructor should not allow the language barrier to cause him to underestimate the intelligence of his foreign audience.

When questions are called for and asked, an instructor's answer should be short and simple. In answering questions put to us by the Chinese



**Reconnaissance: enthusiasm for a new subject**




**Demonstrations: the ABCs of the LVTs**

we attempted to wait for the entire question and to understand exactly what bothered the student. Sometimes it was better to permit the interpreter to answer the question directly, but it was always important not to wander from the point and give a sub-lecture. It is exasperating to be told that the lecture has ended and then be forced to sit and listen to another 20 minutes of lecturing during a period which should have been devoted to questions and answers only.

Analogies must be to the point and must be kept in hand. Many an instructor can get so tangled up in analogies and hypothetical examples that he will wander from his point and ignore the outline and time allocation for his subject. A good instructor does not show off nor expand on extraneous matter. Most questions, it should be remem-

bered, can be answered in three ways — "Yes," "No" and "I don't know." If the answer to a question must be translated into a foreign language, make certain you don't "foul up the fire drill."

Teaching the Chinese Marines was a rewarding experience. It was a lesson in leadership, understanding and clear thinking that was in itself a profitable experience for the men concerned. The conclusions are readily apparent. Traditional teaching methods were found valid and the principles of effective teaching were made more clear to us. We feel that planning and patience on the part of instructors combined with a most receptive and enthusiastic group of students enabled us to teach the principles of amphibious warfare to the Chinese Marine Corps — a corps that may be extremely helpful to us some day. US MC



# Air interdiction

Earth-churning and rail-cutting won't stop the enemy's supplies.

Vehicles and rolling stock must be destroyed

By LtCol S. B. Folsom

WAR IS NOT A COMPETITIVE sport in which the opponent should be given ample opportunity to train prior to the game, or once met, to be allowed unrestricted substitutions. The opponent must be harassed as he enters the arena, and divorced from his fans once he enters the fray.

This harassment and divorcement may be accomplished by interdiction\*—a term that may be defined as the process of disrupting enemy

\*Interdict—to prevent or hinder by any means, enemy use of an area or route. (Dictionary of U.S. Military Terms—1st Rev.)



lines of communication, or the division of enemy components through the application of force at predetermined points.

We are concerned here with the employment of aircraft in interdiction but it should be understood that interdiction procedures are neither new to the art of war, nor are they the single property of aviation. The horse cavalry and privateer of yesterday have been replaced by the mechanized unit and submarine of today. These, together with aircraft, may be employed as interdiction weapons. In fact any means of projecting ordnance outside the immediate front line is a means of interdiction. The artillery projectile which arcs over the MLR and explodes on a position to the rear is performing an interdiction mission.

So we find that in warfare of any type, past or present, land, sea or air, interdiction procedures have been used, for it is of primary importance to neutralize the enemy's capability to supply himself.

There are those who contend the usefulness of air interdiction programs, but few if any of these have suggested that the other means of isolating the combat area be forgotten—long-range artillery continues, sea lanes are cut and neutralization through envelopment is a respected maneuver. It is therefore apparent that the disruption of the opposition's lines of communication remains a major consideration, only the means of accomplishing it is in question. This question arises most firmly in the Marine Corps where close air support overwhelms other considerations.

Accepting close air support as a tactic of prime importance should not (in this acceptance) relegate air interdiction to a position of no importance. To do so would be to advance the theory that the battle can only be fought on a specified field where lines of communication are not in the game. Air can support ground beyond the immediate field of view of the man on the ground, and it is not realistic to fire artillery shells 20 miles and at the same time restrict air operation to one or two miles from the front.

On the assumption that air interdiction is seen by some in a bad light, let us review the problem.

Korea offered a recent fine example—the Yalu River sanctuary not excepted. When engaged in a war in which a sanctuary is a reality, the interdiction program must be formed to fit. To say this is impossible is to put ourselves in the position of the proverbial farmer who in attempting to give directions finally said, "You can't get there from here." We could have gone there in Korea not simply to do the job, but more important to prepare ourselves for future eventualities. We can best cover this subject by starting with the fundamentals.


A route or an area is not alone subject to interdiction. It is only when the route or area becomes or may become a line of communication, (i.e. to support traffic) that interdiction becomes possible. Therefore it is evident that a target for interdiction is composed of two elements—the supporting surface and the vehicle supported. In planning an interdiction program these two elements must be closely surveyed to ascertain which element offers the best target—this "best target" results from a study of vulnerability, replacement factors and defendability.

Interdiction of a sea lane normally is best served by destruction of the vehicle as the supporting surface

is, of course, invulnerable. Interdiction of road or railroad systems may be served by destruction of the vehicle, cutting the surface or a combination of both. In the case of land programs with which this article is primarily concerned, the nature of the terrain, the enemy's capability for restoration and the enemy's active and passive air defense measures must be evaluated prior to selection of interdiction methods.

Generally speaking, a route is less vulnerable to attack than the vehicles which are supported by that route. This proposition is based on the assumption that vulnerability is not judged alone on assailability but rather on the lasting effect of these assaults. In Korea we did not produce lasting effects in our interdiction effort. A proclamation of complete failure is not intended here—the program simply did not produce what it should have. With air superiority over the enemy's communication areas, movement of sufficient traffic to support a large army even in a stalemate could have been made impossible. The fact that an enemy force succeeded under such pressures proved his ability to out-think and, therefore, out-manuever us.

How did this happen? Our original concept was apparently solid—



*Rails from one track  
used to repair the other*



all traffic was attacked with such efficiency that nothing of any size could move on enemy-held roads during the day. Where the solid concept failed is reflected in that one word "day." We knew our target element to start with—traffic! We hit the vehicles—we stopped them. Then the enemy took to the cover of darkness and we did not follow him — we changed our target element. Some night effort was made but the large majority of missions continued during the daylight hours. Being unable to shift our weight we were carried by our momentum into a program of route plowing. The earth was churned, but being earth, suffered little lasting damage. Bomb craters were filled in, broken bridges by-passed and supplies moved forward.

Route-cutting requires medium to heavy bombs directly on the target but vehicle neutralization can be accomplished with every variety of aerial weapon—with near misses effective in many cases. Strafing, rockets and napalm, the more accurate means of aircraft weapons projection, are not effective anti-route measures. A bomb dropped on a route will at best sever the route temporarily. On the other hand, a weapon-hit on a vehicle may destroy the vehicle, destroy the supplies and personnel it carries and sever the route temporarily. Whereas accuracy is usually greater in daylight operations, this is counter-balanced in interdiction proceedings when the vehicle element appears only at night.

In Korea we were obviously successful in suppressing such movement in the daytime but we were singularly unsuccessful at night. This failure to interdict the enemy lines of communication can be attributed almost entirely to the failure to try. The few aircraft employed at night did not, by any stretch of the imagination, represent a concerted night operation. Neither did the intermittent employment of aircraft in greater strength represent a genuine effort. It cannot be expected that a sudden shift in emphasis from day to night interdiction can or will produce immediate results. The night location and destruction of surface targets is a problem of some proportions but it is not one that will be solved through being avoided. We

cannot justify the employment of large numbers of aircraft in soil-rotation bombing during daylight hours when the targets appear only at night. The precept that it is better to hit one oxcart in the sunshine than to attempt to hit a thousand trucks in the starlight is open to question.

Another approach to this subject is that which is reflected in the road and rail-cutting program. Considerable expenditure was made in this line on the assumption that as non-mobile targets these routes could be cut in the daylight so that they would be unusable at night. Here again, as the enemy stockpiles emphasized, the program failed. To repair a road, only earth and manpower are needed—the enemy had plenty of both. To repair a railroad, earth, manpower, rails and ties are needed. The enemy again had the earth and manpower, and rails and ties are articles relatively easy to produce or procure. To repair a bridge the basic ingredients are the same as the above—only a few complications are added. Therefore, it is readily apparent that no serious problem is presented by route cuts. These routes are useful only in providing a surface for the movement of relatively complicated vehicles—the truck, the locomotive and the railcar. They are not produced in North Korea, and few places in China provide industrial facilities that manufacture these vehicles. A truck destroyed in Ichon must be replaced by one from the USSR. Manpower, earth, and simple rails do not provide the answer to the destroyed truck or locomotive.

IN SITUATIONS similar to Korea we must concentrate on the enemy's vehicles. If he uses these vehicles under cover of darkness we must penetrate this cover. Vehicles must move to be of any use, and to move they must use prepared routes since their very movement nullifies the protection usually afforded by camouflage, concentrated anti-aircraft and the normal means of defense. Whereas a bridge may have heavy AA defenses, a route by its physical length tends to disperse such AA. Vehicles must move along the entire length of this route and are therefore subject to attack at any point. In short,

the only real protection for the enemy vehicular movement is night and/or bad weather. The night can be overcome with present equipment if we are inclined to try. There are 24 hours in the day; therefore, we cannot set aside banking hours to perform the air warfare mission.

A LARGE PROPORTION of the presently available aircraft squadrons should be trained to accomplish night interdiction missions. In combat theaters, areas of responsibility should be assigned with sufficient aircraft (illuminating and attack) to provide coverage for those areas. Coverage should be constant. However, care must be taken to avoid schedules interpretable by the enemy. Development of improved tactics and techniques should progress with the operation.

The success of any such campaign cannot be judged on the basis of a short-time period, the weight of ordnance expended, the number of enemy seen or an increased operational accident rate. It would not be necessary to destroy a single vehicle if the presence of aircraft overhead interrupted the traffic movement through fear of attack. First and foremost the effectiveness of a campaign cannot be ascertained on a formula of "Mission flown  $\times$  Ordnance expended." These factors which are a means are too often confused as an end.

The fact that Korea has been used as a basis for judging the effectiveness of air interdiction procedures should in no way restrict the application of the findings in other places at other times. Each situation must of course be viewed in the light of its own particular requirement; however, it is generally true that interdiction must be accomplished on a 24-hour basis. The selection of the target element should pivot on this requirement. If route-cutting, cannot stop the flow of traffic then it becomes necessary to destroy the traffic on the route. Where night operations are necessitated by enemy activity these operations should be accomplished in force. In short, it is mandatory that the enemy be allowed no freedom of movement at any time. If we cannot force him into the sunlight we must illuminate the night.

US MC

# in brief



U. S. Naval personnel who fought with Marines in Korea, or who serve in any future FMF engagements will be entitled to wear the miniature Marine emblem shown above.



On his recent tour of the Pacific the Commandant greeted his old friends, the Samoan chiefs of Hawaii (above). LtGen F. A. Hart, CG FMFPac, looks on.

Celebrating the Corps' 178th anniversary by becoming American citizens (below), 29 Marines were sworn in together at a mass ceremony held at Wilson, N. C.



The former training grounds of the Japanese Army have new tenants: the 3d Mar Div (above). Mt. Fuji forms the backdrop. Below, Marines of the 3d Engineer Bn cement Japanese-American relations by grading a new athletic field for a school near Camp Gifu.





Beginning this month, all Parris Island recruits assigned to posts or sea duty, first will receive four weeks of individual combat training at Camp Lejeune. Emphasis will be on weapons, general subjects and tactics.

The world's most powerful transmitter, capable of instantaneous and reliable broadcasts to all parts of the world, was recently unveiled near Seattle by the Navy and Radio Corporation of America.



Sleek looking as the Douglas-built X-3 research aircraft is (right), the needle-nosed, stub-wing plane weighs more than the familiar DC-3 transport. Incidentally, the wing of the X3 is less than the span of the tail of the DC-3. Performance of the new craft has not been disclosed.





By Col J. D. Hittle



## ***JAPAN'S PREDICAMENT***

... her Empire lost, her source of raw materials cut off,

Japan faces the future not knowing which way to turn

THE POST-WAR PLIGHT OF A defeated nation is never a happy one. However, some nations, blessed by a generous victor and a basically strong economy, find the road to recovery relatively smooth. Such was the case of France after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, and even Germany after World War I.

Such has not been the case of Japan, defeated in World War II. Although Japan has experienced what is probably the most humane and magnanimous treatment ever accorded a vanquished nation by the victor, she has had to travel what at least is a rocky road toward recovery. The ultimate re-establishment of a

sound Japanese national economy has not been achieved, and what is of more importance, such an achievement is by no means even a distant certainty.


This is not to deny that Japan has made a significant—even a surprising—recovery in the relatively few years since the ceremony on the





***A population of 100 million by 1970***

***Industries dependent on imported raw materials***



***Lots of coal, but not the right kind***



***Their best fishing waters are posted***

U.S.S. *Missouri* in Tokyo Bay. But such a recovery has been attributable more to direct and indirect U. S. aid and the hardy resilience of the Japanese people than to the essential soundness of the Japanese economy. An understanding of what has happened to the power base of Japan requires a review of how that power base was acquired and used. In the first place, Japan's phenomenal passage from an isolated, technically backward feudal kingdom to a modern power capable of contending for control of the Pacific Basin and Asia was no accident of history. Rather, Japan's rise was the result of a carefully calculated governmental policy following Commodore Perry's 1854 visit which forced Japan to open her door to Western trade.

In the long view of history it can be seen that Commodore Perry did much more than negotiate a treaty for trade and humane treatment of shipwrecked American seamen.

In addition to forcing open two small doors for trade, he pried open the long-shut eyes of Japan, through which Japan saw the marvels of Western technological advancement. Once Japan was launched—involuntary as it may have been—on the rough seas of international affairs, she came to an early and deliberate decision that a powerful Japan was the only desirable kind of Japan,

and the way to power was through development of the necessary industrial base. Thus, the chain reaction set off by Perry's visit had direct political as well as long range military and economic results.

Politically, it led to the end of the Shogunate-Emperor dual government as all authority was, in 1868, vested in the Emperor. This marks the beginning of modern Japan and her rise to power.

The Japanese formula for primacy in the Pacific was based upon the reciprocal influences of military strength, industrial development and conquest of an overseas empire as a source of raw materials and a market for manufactured goods. It can be seen how each of these factors both depended upon and contributed to the others. And even while the ambitious scheme for power was being conceived, Japan was a nation deficient in key natural resources and foodstuffs. How Japan erected a heavy industry and real military power on the base of a scarcity economy is one of the real phenomena in the history of modern nations. But, it is no mystery.

As the following recapitulation indicates, the growth of Japanese power was characterized by the parallel and progressive development of industrial policies attuned to the raw material sources made available by overseas conquest. This conquest, in turn, was furthered by the military strength stemming from a growing home-based industry.

***Rice—the basic item***

Acme



Prior to 1868, the beginning of the modern Meiji period, Japanese manufacturing was of a sustenance, home-craft type performed by highly skilled, non-industrialized craftsmen.

From 1868 to 1893 preliminary development of large-scale industrialization was initiated. This was accomplished through hiring of foreign technicians and importation of industrial machinery. This phase of Japan's industrial development was subsidized by the government, and it thus set the pattern of government financial support that was to characterize her subsequent industrialization. During this period the light industry base, principally textiles and silk, expanded rapidly. Also, the foundation for further growth was provided by an ambitious railroad construction program. The emphasis on textiles was logical, as there was a ready domestic and Asian market for these items. In addition, the overseas sources of coal and metals to support heavy industry had not been obtained.

From 1893 to 1913 the Empire began to come into being through acquisition of Formosa (1895) and annexation of Korea (1910). Industrialization quickly expanded to the heavy industrial shipbuilding, production of capital goods and chemicals. The whole industrial structure was designed primarily for export and military purposes. Home consumption was, as is customary for nations bent on conquest, of very secondary importance.

In the period from 1914-1935 Japan, benefiting by World War I, obtained much of the British and most of the German markets in Asia. Also, the vitally important resources of Manchuria became available (1931), and a further development and diversification of the national industrial base resulted.

From 1935 to the beginning of World War II the increasing exploitation of overseas resources facilitated a pronounced shift from light to heavy industry, which, of course, was pointed toward a war economy. The steady pre-World War II shift from light to heavy industry is indicated by the following:

Percent of total production:	1930	1937	1942
Heavy industry	38.2	57.8	72.7
Light industry	61.8	42.2	27.3



What is doubly significant about Japanese economic growth is the fact that the industrial structure of Nippon's power was erected on the very shaky foundation of a domestic economy of scarcity and a dependence upon a conquered overseas empire for a critical portion of required raw materials. As long as the fruits of conquest (raw materials) could be harvested and shipped to the home islands for fabrication and the finished products could be exported to the empire markets, Japa-

problem facing post-war Japan.

The problems that engender doubt as to the ultimate domestic recovery of Japan are basic in character and can be summarized as:

- Loss of foreign sources of raw materials
- Loss of foreign markets
- Too large a population
- Inadequate food production

Although these problems are closely intertwined in the scheme of Japan's national economy, we will, for the purposes of this discussion, iden-



*Rice—the best crop for the tight little island*

nese industry and economy as a whole was on a working, but a delicately balanced, basis. As the Japanese economy reached its early WW II peak it depended on an effective but precarious balance of overseas markets and sources of raw materials. The foundation for that economic house of cards was the overseas empire consisting primarily of Formosa, Korea, Manchuria and North China.

This brief review of Japanese industrial development should serve to point up the manner in which the loss of the overseas empire jeopardizes the solution of each basic

tify and consider them separately.

Looking at the loss of foreign sources of raw materials, as in Japan's case, we find that iron and coal are the prime indispensables of national power. These two items, iron and coal, while certainly not the only examples, illustrate clearly Japan's dependence upon her overseas empire. In the latter pre-war years Japan obtained only 16½ percent of her iron ore requirements from domestic sources. In contrast, China provided 30 percent and Korea 7½ percent of the total Japanese needs. Because Japan shopped for iron ore throughout the world, the remain-



ing percentage came from many scattered sources. The significant point is, of course, that China and Korea furnished Japan with over twice the tonnage that Japan could furnish herself.

Japan has a reasonably good supply of coal, but it is mostly of low or medium quality. Only four-tenths of one percent is even a low grade anthracite. The result is that Japan is deficient in the coking coal so necessary for steel production. Here again we have an excellent example of Japan's past dependence on her empire:

Manchuria provided 46 percent, North China 21 percent and Korea and Formosa 15 percent—a total of 82 percent—of Japan's coking coal!

Defeat in WW II meant loss of the overseas empire. Formosa has been returned to the Chinese. If Formosan sources are made available the price will be much higher than when Formosa was exploited for the benefit of Japanese economy. The resources of China and Manchuria are no longer at the disposal of the Japanese, as Japan is separated from those former sources of iron and coal by the barriers that separate the nations of the Red orbit from the free world. Korea, too, has slipped the yoke of Japanese control. While it is possible that Korean iron ore and coal may sometime again be available to Japan through negotiation, such supplies will be dependent upon the economic rehabilitation of Korea, a development that does not appear to be scheduled for the immediate future.

Thus Japan, deprived of her empire and its iron and coal, must turn to other sources of supply. This means competitive bidding on the international market, which is obviously a more expensive procedure than was the exploitation of the empire's resources. This in turn has its further effect on Japanese economy, for the higher prices for raw materials force Japan to charge higher prices for her products, all serving to destroy the advantages Japan enjoyed in the pre-war years when she was able to undersell her international competitors. Unless Japan can find buyers for her exports she will be unable to purchase raw materials on the world market. Under such conditions final recovery and



Wide World

#### ***Cotton market—competition from former customers***

freedom from U. S. aid remains a remote possibility. This leads to the next problem, that of loss of foreign markets.

Japan in the latter 19th and pre-war 20th century closely paralleled the 18th century British mercantile system by which the low-cost raw materials from the British Empire were fabricated in England and then the finished materials were exported for sale overseas.

Japan's pre-war trade pattern for the period 1930-1934 demonstrated the crucial importance of her trade with Asia, and particularly with her overseas empire. During that period about 66 percent of all Japanese imports were from Asia and over 80 percent of those imports from Asia came from the empire — Korea, China, Manchuria and Formosa.

During the same period Japanese exports to Asia mounted to 60 percent of total exports, and in return, well over half of total Asian exports by Japan went to her empire markets. This means that if Japan is to achieve recovery she must recapture all her pre-war Asian trade and because the empire has been lost, post-war trade must be expanded to compensate for the loss of the empire's export and import role.

But the recapture of even the

previous non-empire markets in Asia is a highly questionable capability. As previously noted, Communist Asia is now closed to Japanese trade. That leaves southeast Asia as the only significant market potential. Here too, Japan's trade outlook is not a bright one, for southeast Asian nations are developing their own industries, particularly textiles, which constituted the greatest single element of Japanese pre-war exports to Asia. Thus these nations that formerly were customers are now at least partially filling their own requirements and are also on the way to becoming competitors for the narrowing Asian market. A further complication stems from the fact that India, which played an important role in pre-war Japanese trade, is experiencing an industrial expansion both in light and heavy goods.

Japan's post-war effort to re-establish her cotton export trade illustrates how, in spite of her relatively great strides in rehabilitation of her war-damaged industrial base, the vitally important foreign cotton market is not easily recaptured. What is of special significance is that the upward post-war trend in cotton exports has been reversed.

The recent report of the British Cotton Board revealed that Ja-





**No room to grow fodder for draft animals**

pan's 1952 cotton exports fell 25 percent below the totals for 1951. In view of the major role cotton has played in Japanese overseas trade this drop in export of cotton yardage underlines the obstacles to recapture of foreign markets. This 1952 export-cotton drop reflects the increasing competition resulting from an expanding cotton textile industry in the nations of southeast Asia, as well as the competition stemming from England's drive to expand her foreign textile markets. Also, the 1952 drop in Japanese cotton exports to 25 percent below the 1951 total pointedly illustrates that overseas demand for goods does not necessarily parallel the physical rehabilitation of the industrial capability.

Although the set-back in cotton exports has deeply serious implications with respect to Japanese economic recovery, there is a real possibility that additional foreign markets can be established by the current Japanese production trend toward glass, nylon and saran fibers, and vinyl plastics. If such a program is successful, it will be another example of Japanese dependence upon Western technology.

So, what does it add up to? Approximately this:

Recapture of the non-empire markets is improbable. Formosan and Korean markets cannot appreciably make up for such losses.

The "bamboo curtain" now separates Japan from her previously vast northeast Asian markets. Hence, she must not only struggle against odds to regain her pre-war markets in the

remainder of Asia, but she must also attempt to make up for the loss of Asian markets by exporting to the Western world. Here again, the trade outlook has many features of a blind alley, for trade with the Western world is complicated by tariffs and currency barriers.

The complications of national economic survival in the modern world are heavily underlined in the case of post-war Japan. Japan is, as previously stated, an essentially have-not nation, dependent on overseas sources for the raw materials to feed her industry. Without overseas markets she cannot create the foreign credits to purchase those raw materials. So Japan is caught in the vicious circle of dependence on overseas sources of raw materials coupled with inadequate foreign markets.

These trade deficiencies are intensified by Japan's very basic problem of too large a population. When Commodore Perry landed in Japan the population of the home islands was around 28 to 30 million, just about what the total had been since 1700. As is the case of all technologically backward nations that pass into an era of scientific and technological advancement, Japan's industrial revolution was accompanied by a drastic population increase. By 1890 the total jumped to 42 million and in 1918 it reached 54 million, almost double the total at the time of Perry's visit 64 years previous, and the trend was still upwards. In 1930 it was 64 million and by 1940, the last pre-war year, it sky-rocketed to 73 million.

World War II, with all its high

cost in Japanese lives, did not significantly alter the spiraling population figures. The current total is almost 86,000,000. What actually has happened is that Japan, in this post-war period, finds herself the victim of a two-way economic strain resulting from a severe contraction of resources and a severe expansion of population.

The seriousness of its population problem is further emphasized by the estimate that by 1970 the Japanese in the home islands will total somewhere between a minimum of 100 million and a maximum of 114 million.

Unfortunately Japan, unlike great land-power nations such as the United States and Russia, has not been able to absorb an increasing population by pushing back the boundaries of a vast frontier. For all practicable purposes the Japanese nation has never had a real frontier.

The blunt fact is that even to stabilize the present population a total of 2,500 Japanese would have to leave the home islands every day. Even if such a constant shipping capability could be developed, the problem would remain of where the 2,500 daily total could go. Asia with her teeming millions offers no sanctuary for such a steady stream of immigration.

This increasing population pressure is directly related to the next problem — inadequate food production. This is no new problem for Japan has always, even in the early feudal period, been confronted with the constant spectre of hunger. As a result, much of Japanese history has revolved about the bowl of rice.

Any nation blessed by a fertile agricultural frontier can accommodate a rising population. Japan's almost constant crisis stems from the fact that her rugged geography has offered no such base for expanded food production. The following facts illustrate the gravity of the food problem:

Only 16 percent of the total land area of Japan is arable, or suitable for cultivation. Not even this arable area is favored by a rich natural fertility like, for instance, that of Java where the volcanic soils have high natural productivity. Japan's soils, in their natural state, require exten-

sive fertilization and care.

Yet, it must be recognized that the Japanese have done phenomenally well with what agricultural base nature provided. As a result of hard work and intensive hand-labor methods, Japanese agricultural efficiency provides crop yields per acre that average .5 to 400 percent higher than the rest of the Orient. In the matter of rice, for example, Japan averaged 75.8 bushels per acre. This was almost two thirds greater than the per-acre yield of China, which has a history of efficient rice agricultural methods.

However, there is a practical limit to which natural food production can be increased by efficient agricultural techniques. After that limit has been reached, further production depends on additional land availability.

Here, again, Japan's outlook is not bright.

In spite of the tremendous population growth since the latter 19th century, agricultural acreage has increased (from 1877 to World War II) only 35 percent. That a practical limit has been reached is indicated by the fact that most of the increase was achieved prior to 1900, for since that time the acreage has increased only about five percent. This five percent increase since the turn of the century is all the more significant when it is realized that

during the same period the Japanese population has about doubled. The economic implications are obviously serious for any scarcity-economy nation whose agricultural acreage and total population increases so disproportionately over a 50-year period.

Essentially, there are only two ways of solving the food problem. The first is to increase production. This holds little promise as Japan long ago reached her limit of cheap land reclamation. Some acreage expansion is possible and can help, but it will fall far short of solving the food problem.

No solution is offered by change in kinds of crops. Rice, the basic item, is already the best solution for such an intensive agriculture. Neither is there hope for a solution by improved methods because Japan has for centuries possessed the most efficient agriculture in Asia.

Neither is the outlook favorable for a solution through expansion of the fishing industry. Even now the annual Japanese catch is estimated at less than 50 percent of the pre-war figure. A further complication results from Russian control of the Kurile waters, one of the best fishing areas in the world, which in pre-war years were open to the Japanese fishing fleets. Thus, wherever Japan turns for a domestic solution to her food problem, there appear to be insurmountable barriers.

#### ***Kept from disaster by one billion U. S. dollars a year***



Wide World

Even cursory examination of Japan's food and raw material deficiencies points up the reasons why the eminent geographer, Glenn T. Trewantha, has observed, "Nature did not cut the resource pattern for Japan as befitting a great power."

In summation then, Japan's predicament is a very basic one. Unwittingly, Japan committed economic hari-kari at Pearl Harbor. In losing the war she lost her empire, her sources of raw materials and her markets that provided the credits to purchase raw materials to feed her industry and food to feed her people. What Japan didn't lose was her large population and its desire to eat.

True, Japan has made significant recovery since the end of the war, but there is real reason to believe that much of the come-back has been accomplished on the base of an artificial economy of direct and indirect aid. The authoritative Population Reference Bureau points this up, stating, "Japan is being kept from disaster today by the expenditure of nearly a billion U. S. dollars per year in that country, mainly in connection with the Korean war."

Ultimately, recovery then means re-establishment of her pre-war trading position, at best a difficult achievement. Japan's economic orientation toward northeast Asia — China and Manchuria — was basic to her economy. Having lost that direct relationship with northeast Asia, Japan's position today is in many respects essentially similar to that of Austria in the post-World War I period when Austria emerged from the war without adequate resources. After the end of loans and gifts, coalition with Germany was the final answer.

Thus, Japan, deprived of her northeast Asian economic orientation, poses a grave question for the non-Communist world:

When and if dollar support for her economy dwindles, will Japan, either eagerly or reluctantly, seek economic survival through an "anchulus" with Red Asia?

Unquestionably, a solution of Japan's predicament is important to the Japanese. It is of transcendent importance to us that the solution be found on this side of the "bamboo curtain."

US & MC





# ynopsis:


Though his basic weapon in early times may have been the sword, the spear or the bow, the man with the rifle has been in every war through the ages. At Arabela in 331 B.C. he was a Greek, bronze-helmeted warrior. More than 2,000 year later he was the steel-helmeted U. S. Marine who stormed ashore at Inchon. During the interim many changes in tactics and weapons took place but one factor remained constant—those who chose to ignore the infantryman eventually were defeated. At times eulogized, sometimes neglected, but always respected, the man with the rifle stood firm during the golden years of the Greeks and the Romans, through the Dark Ages and into the Renaissance and the Elizabethan era. Then when war overflowed the Continent to continue in the New World, the rifleman really came into his own. At the Battle of Saratoga the American frontiersman with his long rifle taught the British a painful lesson, which was to exert its influence a generation later on the tactics used by Napoleon and Wellington.



Tactics changed and weapons improved in the Napoleonic wars. In the Civil War the machine gun was introduced and World War I brought the tank and airplane. But through it all, tacticians found no substitute for . . .

## THE MAN WITH THE RIFLE

By Lynn Montross



Bettmann

### Conclusion

ON AN OCTOBER DAY IN 1781 A British army laid down its arms while the band played "The World Turned Upside Down." Cornwallis had surrendered to Washington at Yorktown, and the man with the rifle was there.

The man with the rifle in fact deserved much of the credit for the victory of the American colonists over the mother country in a long war against material odds. Not only had he helped to found a new nation, but also some far-reaching new concepts of infantry tactics. For the young British, French and German officers who took part in the conflict

were returning to Europe to apply some of the more obvious lessons. And the application would have much to do with the outcome of the Napoleonic Wars.

Foremost among these European participants was the Marquis de Lafayette, who had commanded several small American armies with distinction. Two of Napoleon's future marshals, Berthier and Jourdan, had also served in America and returned with praises of American institutions.

Eight years after Yorktown, when the French Revolution broke out, Lafayette urged that a rifle company be included in each battalion of the new National Guard. A few such units actually were raised, but the manufacturing facilities of revolutionary France could not supply enough smooth-bore muskets, let alone rifles which took much longer to manufacture in those days of handcraft industries.

Lafayette, in his admiration of all things American, made the error of supposing that American tactics could be adopted wholesale by the French revolutionary armies. But tactics are as much an expression of a nation's own genius as any manifestation of peacetime culture. The American rifleman had been shaped by his environment; he had learned from his fights with the Indians that

a man must take cover and shoot straight if he cherishes his scalp. Even the Yankee farmers and villagers of Bunker Hill, though far removed from the frontier, knew how to aim a smooth-bore musket and dig in for protection. They recognized that the spade was as important an adjunct of good infantry tactics as a well cleaned and oiled firearm.

Practically every American, man and boy, had his own musket or rifle and knew how to use it. In 18th century Europe, on the contrary, possession of firearms was the prerogative of the gentry. Commoners were not allowed that privilege, since they might poach on some aristocrat's game preserve or even revolt against their lords and masters. It is not surprising, therefore, that Picardy peasants and Paris street gamins did not show much aptitude for a system of tactics so alien to their background. As for the French generals, they granted that aimed fire at will, as distinguished from the commanded platoon volleys of linear tactics, had its uses. They conceded that informal American methods of marching might give an advantage over European armies marching in cadence at a slow and stately pace.

In other respects, however, the American Revolution proved entirely too moderate to suit French extremists who sent Lafayette into ex-

ile and beheaded defeated generals.

In 1792 the new French republic was beset by a coalition of enemy nations which included England, Holland, Prussia, Austria, Spain and Sardinia. In desperation, the French passed a universal conscription law and ordered their armies to go without tents and baggage wagons while living on the country both for food and shelter. And it was not long before the raw and untrained revolutionists began to beat the well drilled and equipped armies of the invaders.


The term "horde tactics," applied in derision to the new French methods of making war, was really an apt description. For it would hardly be stretching it to say that the revolutionists turned a battle into a riot and mobbed the enemy. At the outset the more daring recruits crept

the battlefield. Neither hampered by much baggage, nor bound to magazines for supplies, the French could cover twice as much ground as the enemy. Conscription gave them a vast numerical advantage, and the turning point came when the revolutionists advanced in dense masses, called bayonet columns. If a panic did not overtake them, they were likely to endure heavy casualties while swarming over the foe from front and flank to crush him by sheer weight of numbers.

It is to the credit of young General Bonaparte in 1796 that his cold, gray eye saw the potentialities rather than the crudities of horde tactics. In his first Italian campaign, he faced 55,000 Austrians and Piedmontese and 150 guns in the Italian Riviera with 40,000 ragged troops and 60 guns.

peared, linear tactics had decided Europe's battles for a century and a half. Concentric columns of attack, deploying into line for commanded platoon volleys, were favored for the tactical offensive. The cordon system was the approved method of strategic defensive. Consisting of a chain of fortified posts and magazines, each threatened link could, in theory, be quickly reinforced by troops from near-by positions. Bonaparte soon demonstrated, however, that his men could outmarch an enemy depending on the cordon system and beat him in detail.

"The essence of strategy is, with a weaker army, always to have more force at the crucial point than the enemy," explained Bonaparte at a later date. Unfortunately, he did not offer much enlightenment to aspir-



forward on their own initiative, using trees and ditches for cover, to fire their muskets at an enemy drawn up in three precise ranks awaiting the word of command. It was a fairly safe game for French skirmishers who did not offer much of a target but whose harassing fire thinned enemy ranks in spite of bad marksmanship. If the enemy was goaded into replying with a futile volley, the French hugged the earth and let the bullets whistle overhead. And if the enemy advanced, the French scuttled to the rear to rejoin their less valorous comrades.

Meanwhile, every French unit within earshot was marching toward

The Allies held a chain of posts and magazines for the defense of Milan and Turin. Bonaparte seized a junction point where a good transverse road linked up the four river valleys held by the foe. Then he struck with bewildering rapidity, marching incredible distances and bringing a local superiority of numbers to bear on one opposing force after another.

It is an amusing note that the Austrian general counted on Bonaparte never daring to venture between two enemy columns. This was exactly his purpose, and he won four combats in as many days, compelling the enemy to ask for a truce.

Until the "Corsican upstart" ap-

ing conquerors when he added, "But this art is taught neither by books nor by practice; it is a matter of intuition."

In his Italian campaigns of 1796-1797, the 27-year-old general defeated a succession of Austrian commanders and destroyed their armies. He drove between two enemy forces at Castiglione and beat them both after fighting five actions in five days. One of his columns marched 114 miles in six days during the ensuing pursuit and won three combats meanwhile.

The final and decisive battle showed what could be accomplished by "horde tactics" when they were

## Waterloo—a dramatic postscript to history



Bettmann

**"Napoleon did not maneuver at all. He just moved forward in the old style, and was driven off in the old style." — Wellington**

**Left: Well-aimed rifle balls forced Cornwallis to surrender his sword**

Bettmann

executed by veterans and directed by genius. The tactical system which had evolved from military poverty was little changed, for it still profited from two American lessons—fire at will, and rapid marching at an informal route step. Both played an important part in the battle of Rivoli when an army of 43,000 men made the fourth Austrian effort to relieve Mantua, besieged by Bonaparte. He had beaten off the three former attempts, and again he left a detachment behind to blockade the fortress while hastening to meet the enemy.

The clash took place on a plateau east of Lake Garda. As usual, Bona-

parte relied on the marching ability of his men and waited to ascertain the enemy's intentions before concentrating. Meanwhile it was the mission of his skirmishers, including the remnants of Lafayette's rifle companies, to harass the three converging Austrian columns and delay their advance. In spite of these efforts, the French were badly outnumbered when the battle opened. Bonaparte was hard-pressed until battalion after battalion of reinforcements appeared at a quickstep and got into action without rest. And at the climax the French had the advantage in weight as they crushed the three enemy columns in turn, winning the battle and taking 12,000 prisoners.

Some of Bonaparte's men had fought a delaying action near Verona the day before, then completed an all-night march to participate in the battle of Rivoli. Without any recuperation, they set out after the

engagement on a new march of 31 miles. Reaching Mantua in the morning, they surprised a relieving force of 9,000 Austrians and compelled them to surrender. This blow shattered the last hope of the garrison, and the fortress was starved into capitulation. Bonaparte had cleared Italy of enemies; and in the spring of 1797 he marched on Vienna, only to be met 80 miles from the city by Austrian envoys asking for terms.

These results had been gained by one of the great infantry armies of history. Such supporting arms as artillery and cavalry were kept at a minimum while Bonaparte's foot-sloggers marched across the burning deserts of Egypt in 1798 and over the snowbound passes of the Alps in 1800. This army reached its height five years later, when its leader made his first campaign as Emperor.


From Boulogne, where he had threatened an invasion of England, Napoleon set out by forced marches





*These men valued the infantryman, and knew how to use him . . .*

*Grant: His cavalry raided, but infantry took the ground*



*Thomas: Strain shooting rifles earned him a*

to fight the Austrian and Russian allies. On the way he destroyed an Austrian army of 60,000 men chiefly by maneuver, about half of this force surrendering at Ulm without striking a blow.

The Emperor pressed on to Vienna, then invaded Moravia with 68,000 troops to meet an Allied army of 83,000. As an example of French marching prowess, Marshal Davout's corps covered the last 90 miles in 68 hours, arriving at the battlefield the night before the action began. This force of 12,500 men was given the mission of containing 40,000 enemy on the French right until Napoleon could aim his knockout blow at the weakened center and cut the Allied army in two.

The battle of Austerlitz was the conqueror's masterpiece. And the following year he crushed Prussia in a single day by destroying the bulk of that kingdom's armed forces in the twin battles of Jena and Auerstedt.

Throughout history it has been the rule that a military instrument is weakening when the infantry relies too much on supporting arms. The year 1807 dated the beginnings of the great French artillery "preparations" when Napoleon massed his 12-pounders almost literally wheel-to-wheel at ranges of a few hundred yards to blast a bloody path for the bayonet columns. Musketry had meanwhile fallen into such decline

that recruits of this period scarcely knew how to load a flintlock.


France had known few and brief interludes of peace for 16 years when Napoleon invaded Spain in 1808. It is understandable that his subjects were so weary of war that it took a small army to enforce the detested conscription law. Spain would have been a hard nut to crack at best, and the invasion provided an opening for Napoleon's most stubborn enemy. Britannia had ruled the waves throughout this troubled era, and land forces were sent from England to the aid of Spain and Portugal.

While other armies were copying Napoleon's tactical system as best they could, the British had learned some lessons of their own from the American Revolution. Their preceptor was Sir John Moore, who had been a youthful ensign in the British forces of 1779 which defeated the American expedition against Penobscot. The operation started promisingly when the Continental and Massachusetts Marines secured beachheads in the foremost American amphibious assault landing of the war. Then the rebels paid the penalties of divided command and disputes between land and sea forces. But even though the expedition ended in disaster, young Moore saw much to admire in the skirmishing tactics and the aimed musket and rifle fire used by the enemy.

Twenty-four years later he found his opportunity after being placed in command of a camp at Shorncliffe for the purpose of training troops to oppose the threatened invasion of England by Napoleon. Moore prescribed the two-rank formation which Cornwallis had learned from the Americans in the Revolution. Later known as "the thin red line of the Peninsula," it allowed a wider front for musketry. He then increased his infantry firepower by training three regiments armed with the rifle; and his famous Light Division became the largest body of troops in all Europe to be equipped exclusively with that weapon.


Moore was killed in one of the early British operations on the Peninsula, but his successor was the undefeated general known to history as the Duke of Wellington. In spite of his unbroken string of victories, this soldier has been criticized in all his major battles. But since he won them all, it may be that the French were at fault for never varying their approach. They came on with the same clouds of skirmishers screening the advance of the same bayonet columns that had been winning battles for nearly two decades. But Wellington had much better skirmishers in the riflemen of the Light Division. They usually made chaff of the French skirmishers and severely harassed the enemy bayonet columns while falling back on the main body

**Jackson: His "foot cavalry" held off the Northern army**



Bettmann

**General Robert E. Lee: He depended on a force of entrenched riflemen**



Bettmann



Bettmann

of British troops.

Whenever possible, Wellington drew up his two ranks on the reverse slope of a low ridge. This ground offered protection from ricocheting cannon balls and compelled the enemy columns to plod uphill. When they arrived, slightly out of breath, they were treated to steady platoon volleys.

Although Napoleon's armies had previously gained in mobility by living on the country, they starved in Spain while the Redcoats were being regularly supplied from the sea. It has been aptly said that Spain was the death of the French army. Disease and malnutrition killed more men than the British; and after defeating every French army he fought, Wellington was invading France when the Allies banished Napoleon.

Waterloo provided one of the most dramatic postscripts of history, but it cannot be said that Napoleon made a much better showing than former French generals beaten by Wellington. One of them, Marshal Soult, tried to advise the Emperor but was rebuffed. And though millions of words have been written to describe the battle, it would be hard to improve upon Wellington's terse account:

"Napoleon did not maneuver at all. He just moved forward in the old style, and was driven off in the old style."

Waterloo was followed by a cen-

tury of comparative peace lasting until the first World War. The only major conflict during this period was the American Civil War, which introduced the first machine gun, the first breech-loading repeating rifle, the first metallic cartridge, the first electrically exploded torpedo, the first railway gun and the first wire entanglement to meet the test of war. The first duel between ironclad warships was followed by the first instance of a submarine sinking a vessel, and such recent inventions as the telegraph, the steamship and the railway were used intelligently by armies for the first time.

IN SPITE of these inventions, the contest was an infantry war decided by the man with the rifle. By this time the flintlock had been replaced by the percussion cap, and ball ammunition by the cylindriconoidal bullet. Range and accuracy were increased and misfires virtually eliminated.

Robert E. Lee perceived that the new infantry firepower could be utilized for purposes of maneuver. An entrenched rifleman could now kill at 500 yards, about five times the range of the flintlock musket, so that a comparatively small force was able to contain large enemy numbers during the progress of a flank attack or envelopment.

In 1776, it may be recalled, it was the simple device of ramming the

ball home with a greased leather patch that made the frontier rifle an instrument of precision. And in 1862 the equally practical "head-log" contributed to tactics. It consisted of a log placed a few inches above another log so as to protect the rifleman's head while providing him with a slit and rest for firing. The axe became as important to Civil War rifle tactics as the spade in wooded country, and it did not take veterans long to dig in behind log-faced entrenchments.

No general of history ever showed more daring than Lee when it came to deploying an outnumbered army within striking distance of the enemy. In nearly every instance he depended on a force of entrenched riflemen; and while they "fixed" large enemy forces, he aimed a surprise blow at an opponent's most vulnerable point.

During the Seven Days' battles, fought within sight of Richmond's steeples, the Confederate general led 87,000 men against McClellan's army of 109,000. But by utilizing works and entrenchments south of the Chickahominy River, Lee was able to contain 75,000 Union troops with 28,000 of his own. With his remaining 59,000, he struck blow after blow at McClellan's 34,000 men on the north bank, and Richmond was saved after a week of desperate fighting. Even so, Lee himself was taught a costly lesson on the last day when he lost 6,000 men in futile attacks on the entrenched Federal riflemen holding Malvern Hill.

Marching played as much of a part as marksmanship in Civil War oper-



ations. Late in the summer of 1863, Stonewall Jackson's "foot cavalry" suddenly appeared in the rear of General John Pope's army and destroyed the stores of the advanced base at Manassas Junction. And though Jackson could have escaped, he invited attack in order to give Lee time to bring up the main body of the Confederate army. Jackson's riflemen, dug in behind a railway embankment, held off the whole Federal army until the next day when Lee arrived to deliver the counterstroke. Thus the second battle of Manassas ended in a victory of 55,000 Confederates over 70,000 Union troops. Pope retreated with losses of 14,000 men and 30 guns at a cost to Lee and Jackson of 9,000 casualties.

At Chancellorsville, in the spring of 1863, the two Confederate generals set a new record for boldness. Their opponent, "Fighting Joe" Hooker, enjoyed a numerical superiority of at least two-to-one with his army of 120,000. He had originally planned to crush his opponents between two larger forces, but they bluffed him into falling back on the defensive in the thickets of the Wilderness. While Lee and Early contained the two main Union forces with fewer than 30,000 men, Stonewall Jackson led 26,000 Confederates around Hooker's right flank for a surprise envelopment. The Federals were routed in this quarter, but



**Marine rifles made them keep their heads down**

Jackson was mortally wounded at dusk by accidental Southern fire. Lee continued the attack in the morning, and the three-day battle ended with 16,000 Federal and 12,000 Confederate casualties.

Terrible losses resulted whenever troops of either side attacked entrenched riflemen. At Antietam the dead lay in windrows along the stone walls, and at Fredericksburg 12,650 Federals were killed or wounded in futile efforts to storm the enemy lines.

At Chickamauga, on the other hand, Union riflemen cheated the South of a probable victory of annihilation after Longstreet shattered Rosecrans' center and right. General George Thomas earned the nickname "Rock of Chickamauga" by standing firm on the left and saving the army from destruction. At times his outnumbered riflemen were attacked from three sides, but they managed to hold in their trenches and even to make an orderly withdrawal.

✿ In 1864, on the outskirts of Atlanta, Union riflemen fired from front and rear to beat off attacks, and Hood's Confederates were repulsed three times in 10 days.

The lessons of infantry firepower taught by the Civil War were confirmed during the next half century by results of such lesser conflicts as the Franco-Prussian War, the Boer War and the Russo-Japanese War. Yet at the outbreak of World War I, in 1914, the French infantry regiments were uniformed in red breeches for the good of their morale. Needless to add, they raised enemy morale by providing excellent targets for German rifles and machine guns.

Within a few months the struggle became the greatest siege of history. The face of Europe was scarred by a tremendous system of trenches and dugouts inhabited by millions of conscripted citizen-soldiers—the human moles of the Western Front. As the deadlock continued, the rifle came to be regarded more or less as a handle for a bayonet. Theoretically it was an infantry war, but actually the artillery took the ground and the bayonets occupied.

In 1917, when America entered the conflict, rifle marksmanship had become secondary in the armies of



Europe. It was considered the business of specialists — the snipers trained to pick off any unwary foe who raised his head.

The U. S. Marines changed all that. The Marines and the regulars of the best Army divisions had been taught how to draw a bead and squeeze a trigger. At Belleau Wood, at Soissons, at Blanc Mont and in the Argonne the Marines demonstrated their skill to the discomfiture of the enemy. Even their marching fire made the Germans lay low, and when prone Marines built up a base of fire, it was far more effective in proportion than machine gun bursts.

The mechanization of armies made such progress during the next two decades that World War I seemed old fashioned when the United States went to war again in 1941. The U. S. Marine Corps had found its greatest mission of history in amphibious warfare, and it was a succession of undefeated assault landings which ripped the Japanese

Empire  
trained  
ous tec  
landing  
mandy  
Axis Po  
mate del  
In al  
there w  
can vict  
Marine  
1942. T  
er, there  
more sw  
er was a  
restore  
was nee  
who slu  
the ene  
abrupt  
man" r  
credenc  
But  
World  
With A  
the hu  
inevital  
Marine C





***There is still no substitute for the rifle and bayonet***

***The man with the rifle:  
one of the few men in  
war who has some choice***

Empire apart. U. S. Army divisions, trained by the Marines in amphibious techniques, were meanwhile landing in Africa, Sicily and Normandy to open up the other two Axis Powers to invasion and ultimate defeat.

In all World War II, however, there was no more inspiring American victory than the fight won by Marine riflemen on Guadalcanal in 1942. There were harder battles later, there were larger operations and more sweeping gains. But there never was a fight which did so much to restore stateside morale when a tonic was needed! For the Leathernecks who slugged it out, toe to toe, with the enemy on Guadalcanal put an abrupt end to the "Japanese superman" myth that had been gaining credence since Pearl Harbor.

But after the final victory in World War II, all was not smooth. With Americans being drafted by the hundreds of thousands, it was inevitable that some of them would

not be first-rate military material. Unfortunately, such men were too often placed in the infantry after other arms of the service had skimmed the cream, and in these instances the consequence was low combat efficiency.

BrigGen S. L. A. Marshall made a personal survey of more than 500 company-size units in World War II and analyzed the findings in his book *Men Against Fire*. He concluded that too often only an active and aggressive minority of the infantry actually did the fighting. The others lagged until the objective was nearly taken, and then joined in the advance.

It was a significant fact, moreover, that the men who shirked were in most instances *the men who did not fire their rifles a single time*. The moral is plain. When a man is trained to *use* his rifle, to have pride and confidence in his marksmanship, he is not likely to lag during the attack. This goes far toward explaining the splendid record of the Marines in World War II, but even so there are Marine officers who contend that not enough emphasis is placed on rifle fire at present, as compared to supporting arms.

At any rate, it is encouraging to learn that General Marshall also spent months with front-line outfits in the Korean conflict, and he reported that American infantry combat efficiency had doubled as com-

pared to World War II. Certainly there are few chapters in our military history as stirring as the assault by three Marine infantry regiments on Seoul, an Oriental city with a pre-war population of a million-and-a-half. Or the breakout from the Chosin Reservoir area when the 1st Marine Division cut its way through eight Chinese Communist divisions. These operations could not have been possible, of course, without air, artillery and other supporting arms. But the man with the rifle was out in front, and at critical moments the outcome depended strictly on this historical character.

It is to the eternal glory of the gravel-cruncher that he is one of the few men in modern warfare who has some *choice* as to whether he attacks aggressively or drags his feet. The sailor on a warship, the crewmen on a bombing plane, the gunner in a tank—these men, once committed, have little or no option. The infantryman does have on many occasions, and he must have the sort of spinal column that is stiffened by the confidence in a weapon and skill in its use.

That is why there is still no substitute for the rifle and bayonet. Even in this new age of atomic warfare, there must still be somebody out in front to seize, to occupy and to defend. And who could be better qualified for the job than our old friend, the man with the rifle? **US MC**

# passing in review

BOOKS OF  
INTEREST TO  
OUR READERS

## From the Frying Pan . . .

**TWO EGGS ON MY PLATE**—Oluf Reed Olsen, 365 pages, illustrated. Chicago: Rand McNally & Co. \$4.50

As exciting as its title is intriguing, *Two Eggs on My Plate* is one of the best spy stories to come out of World War II.

A youth of 21 when his country was invaded, Oluf Reed Olsen joined the resistance movement and plunged into one perilous mission after another. He blew up an important bridge under the very noses of the Germans; photographed an enemy airfield under cover of a savage bombing attack; was captured while "inspecting" a new German plane and barely succeeded in a bold escape. Then Olsen and a friend decided to go to England.

In England, Olsen was trained as an espionage agent and prepared to return to his homeland. One evening he was served two fresh eggs on his plate—a sign that the night had arrived for him to be parachuted into Norway. Setting up headquarters near German military installations, he sent out daily radio reports of enemy activities, often while the Nazis searched for him within a few feet of his position. Many of his compatriots were caught and imprisoned or killed, but Olsen managed to continue to supply the Allies with information which contributed greatly to the success of D-day.

*Two Eggs on My Plate* is a lucidly related tale, and the photographs, taken during the period the book covers, are excellent.

Reviewed by 2dLt John K. Parker

## Winner Take All . . .

**MALENKOV: STALIN'S SUCCESSOR**—Martin Ebon, 284 pages. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1953. \$3.75

Georgi Malenkov was often mentioned as the successor to Stalin upon the latter's natural demise or retirement from his position as Pre-



mier. Of all the Soviets making up the Politburo, and especially those favored few at the very peak, Malenkov has been the least known to the Western world. To some extent this is also probably true as it relates to the Soviet people.

Mr. Ebon has attempted to open this veil of secrecy and provide a picture of the beginnings, workings and schemings of Malenkov.

Malenkov is a manipulator of people. He has always kept close tab on the upper echelons of the party machinery and the men and women making up the structure of power. His work in the secret service during the years of the Moscow trials and afterward enabled him to know the intimate details on all the important Soviets of that period and the present. This knowledge assisted Malenkov in fulfilling his purpose and attaining his goal—power over other men.

Andrei Zhdanov was the "Golden

Boy" in the Soviet hierarchy. He and Malenkov were opposites in methods, approach and experience. Their ambitions were the same. Zhdanov was one of the theorists and thinkers. For a time his star rose while Malenkov settled back into semi-obscurity. Yet, Malenkov rose again, and Zhdanov died.

With Zhdanov's death, Malenkov and his protégés, such as Varga, became more prominent. It was at this time that another contestant entered the ring, Lavrenti Beria. The conflict between these two has ended, and the events in June 1953 may provide the clue to Malenkov's future relations with Molotov and the Army clique.

What course will Malenkov as Premier follow? Zhdanov, who temporarily eclipsed Malenkov, was anti-Western and began the hate campaign. Under Malenkov the Soviet regime has temporarily softened its attitude toward the West and towards its own peoples. It may be more concerned with consolidating past gains and improving its internal strength than with increasing its physical sphere of control. Martin Ebon's book does not provide the answer. The book will not make the reader an expert on Malenkov, but it will decrease the reader's degree of ignorance about the man.

Reviewed by LtCol W. F. Frank

## Guide Right . . .

**ANGELS WATCHED OVER HIM**—Joseph J. Novellino, 220 pages. New York: The William-Frederick Press. \$3.50

In this, his first novel, Joseph J. Novellino has produced a light, easily-read account of one citizen-soldier's experience as an Army reserve officer immediately prior to and during World War II.

Readers are likely to feel that angels watched over Vic, the main character, much less than the title of the book indicates. Like everyone



who is shot at, Vic had some close calls.

The novel finds Vic as a small boy in Italy. It brings him to America and to manhood. In college he meets and immediately falls in love with a campus queen he later marries. The narrative then follows him through a succession of assignments that turn him into an expensively-trained and efficient officer.

Eventually, Vic finds himself a replacement in the European theater. He enters the fight at Omaha Beach and has few dull moments until a serious wound causes him to be evacuated shortly before V-E Day. He is the idol of his subordinates and a rock of stability in a firefight, but often misunderstood by his superiors.

Vic's training is put to the test by the fanatical Nazi storm troopers who often face the two different battalions he commanded. As the dust jacket says, this is a novel of faith put to the test of war. The reader can decide whether Vic's training and faith stood up under the test.

Reviewed by Major Dennis D. Nicholson, Jr.

#### High-level Strategy . . .

STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR COALITION WARFARE: 1941-1942—Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, 382 pages, illustrations, appendices, index and charts. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C.: Department of the Army.

\$3.25

*Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942* begins with a brief resumé of the development of U. S. planning for war in the years before 1940. The account discloses that it was in this period, in the mid-thirties, that differing conceptions of our national requirements and capabilities in the Pacific area developed between the War and Navy Departments which, like a recurring theme in a musical score, were to successively reappear in the efforts of the two departments to settle on a harmonious strategy.

The history then moves into the period following the fall of France, and the struggles to adapt ourselves to the completely changed international situation in military power.

In the meantime, the Pacific situation was coming to a boil. While faced with the necessity of planning

under nebulous assumptions for entry into war in the Atlantic, and expecting that our main effort would be in that direction, the staff was faced with the probability of an early war in the Pacific, an area in which we would have to carry the principle burden of combat.

On 7 December 1941, although many of the problems became less academic in nature, they became more complicated with the swift progress of the Japanese forces. Accepting a strategic defensive in the Pacific did not lessen the problems of providing any defense at all.

The history proceeds with its story of the planning of the first year of war, covering the calculating and recalculating which eventually resulted in the landings on Guadalcanal in August, and in North Africa in November.

It closes with the opening of a new series of discussions as to what course should be taken in following up the successful landings in North Africa.

To Marines particularly, an interesting item is mention of certain of the planning factors used in the 1942 planning for the western France landing then being considered for 1943. One of the big problems was a shortage of landing craft. The plans called for landing craft to boat at one time an assault force of 77,000 men, 18,000 vehicles and 2,250 tanks. This is at the rate of one vehicle per four men boated for the first trip of the landing craft.

For those interested in how national strategic plans are made, unmade and then remade, this volume presents a well-documented and well-organized body of information.

Reviewed by Colonel S. R. Shaw

#### Asiatic Travelogue . . .

A YEAR OF SPACE—Eric Linklater, 273 pages. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company. \$3.50

Called an autobiography on the flyleaf, this book runs the gamut of emotions from the beginning to the end. One meets Lord Wavell in a moment of great humor, King George V engaged in the pleasure of duck hunting, a little child in Korea who is cold and very hungry, and hundreds of other characters who make you laugh and cry in turn.

The story, if such a term may be

applied, is that of the author who has been requested by the British Government to go to Korea and make a report on naval operations, and also look at the ground troops. The result is an extended tour of roaming over the eastern half of the world. Linklater has that unique touch of making everything so correct in its particular niche that one is apt to miss the dry humor connected with it. The book is a work of deliberate understatement which is so deftly done it nearly is overlooked.

If you like the world or any part of it then this book will please you.

Reviewed by 1stLt Paul E. Wilson

#### The Long Fight . . .

THE CHINA TANGLE—Herbert Feis, 445 pages, with maps. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. \$6.00

The struggle for power in China, a struggle still going on under the Communist regime, is more than 30 years old. The Chinese Communist Party became a member of the Kuomintang in 1923 and remained there until expelled in 1927. Chiang Kai-shek emerged as the leader of the National Government and from 1930-1935 open attempts were made to wipe out the strength of the Communist opposition. With the Japanese invasion of China the opposition forces in China joined in battle against the common foe. However, in spite of some co-operation between the Chinese Nationalists and Communists, particularly in 1937-1938, there was no actual unification of either the civil or military authorities of the two parties.

The story of the relations between the United States and China during the last war reveals an interesting mixture of facts and hopes. The United States wished to provide China with the support necessary for the struggle against Japan. Unfortunately there was not enough material to fill all requirements. Since the defeat of Germany had priority, the Pacific theater had to accept far less than it wished. Britain was also unwilling to accord to China recognition as a major power.

The problems which faced Chiang Kai-shek were multiple. There was Japan to be defeated but not at the cost of the strength he needed to continue the struggle against the



Communists. Stilwell was interested in fighting the Japanese on the ground. Chennault was interested in fighting them in the air. The British were interested in fighting but wanted increased means. Meanwhile the U. S. Navy was advancing across the oceanic wastes in a successful naval campaign aimed directly at Japan.

Mr. Feis takes these multiple and frequently opposing events, develops their backgrounds and presents them in an orderly, comprehensible manner. His account is scholarly and authoritative. It appears reasonable to class his book as a substantial contribution towards a better understanding of a problem which still faces the United States today.

Reviewed by LtCol V. J. Croizat

### Dangerous Deep . . .

UNDERSEA PATROL—Edward Young, 298 pages, illustrated. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc. \$3.95

*Undersea Patrol* deserves a special place in the annals of sea adventure for it was written by a man who had never even seen a submarine until

he was assigned to the underwater services. Yet he gained the distinction of becoming one of Britain's greatest submarine captains.

Edward Young, a publisher by civilian profession, joined the submarine branch of the Royal Navy as one of three sub-lieutenant reservists in early 1940. Commander Young takes the reader along with him on all of his assignments which included everything from patrolling off the coast of France to raiding the Japanese infested waters of the South Pacific. Adventure runs rampant through the pages as Young recounts the multiplicity of new impressions he experienced during his first dive, the complete horror which was his when his submarine was very nearly cut in two by a friendly trawler and the thrill of sinking a German U-boat. His travels take him to a tour of duty at Gibraltar and beleaguered Malta and the rugged training course for potential submarine captains before he is accorded the title of "skipper" and comes to know the pride of his own command. This account of Young's exploits in the

British submarine service deserves notice as one of the better sea tales.

Reviewed by Captain Billy C. Mark

### Hitler's Blunders . . .

HITLER'S DEFEAT IN RUSSIA—Lt. Gen W. Anders, 253 pages, illustrated. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company. \$4.00

On 22 June 1941, along a front stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea, the leaders' batons dropped, signalling three German army groups into a surprise assault on Soviet Russia. Army Group North was to cut off Russian forces in the Baltic States and force them to the sea. Army Group Center was to encircle Soviet forces concentrated around and to the east of Bialystok. Army Group South was to cut the enemy's retreat by attacking in the direction of Kiev. By 29 June Army Group North had destroyed 12 to 15 Russian divisions and Army Group Center had encircled four Soviet armies. By 8 July the Germans had taken 289,874 prisoners and captured or destroyed 2,585 tanks, 1,449 guns and 246 aircraft. On 2 December German forces penetrated to the suburbs of Moscow.

Why was Moscow not captured? Why was the German Sixth Army annihilated at Stalingrad? Why could not the German war machine bring to a successful conclusion a campaign so brilliantly begun? LtGen Anders, a Polish officer with an outstanding combat record, traces the German defeat to 11 major blunders committed by Hitler, and to the material aid rushed to Soviet Russia by Britain and the United States prior to the opening of the Second Front.

General Anders explains the strategy of the Germans in planning for the Russian campaign, and then goes on to describe the campaigns of 1941-1942 and those later undertaken by the Germans in 1942-1943.

Excellent battle maps and a complete German order of battle, plus the author's vivid portrayal of the vast spaces over which the battle was fought, the masses of men and machines pitted against each other, and the almost unbelievable numbers of human battle casualties incurred by both contestants, combine to make *Hitler's Defeat in Russia* the best book yet to appear dealing

## IMMEDIATE SAVINGS NOW COMPLETE AUTO INSURANCE



*Savings to 30%*

### GREATER COVERAGE FOR LESS MONEY

IMMEDIATE SAVINGS UP TO . . . 30% . . . from prevailing board rates which apply in your territory can be YOURS on this complete, low-cost Automobile Insurance Policy. GOVERNMENT SERVICES INSURANCE UNDERWRITERS can reduce costs to you because they deal direct with a highly selected and specialized class of policy holders. Protection against loss from bodily injury and property damage, liability . . . medical payments . . . accidental death . . . comprehensive personal liability . . . comprehensive fire and theft coverage. Covers collision damage to your car. Covers towing. Available ONLY to officers and 1st 3-grades non-commissioned officers.

### HOUSEHOLD CONTENTS FLOATER POLICY

This Household and Personal Floater Policy covers everything personal anywhere in the U. S. or abroad. It protects your household goods, clothing, uniforms, furniture, jewelry and valuable personal effects. Insures you against 14 named perils. Greatest coverage protection at lowest cost.

### GOVERNMENT SERVICES INSURANCE UNDERWRITERS (NOT AFFILIATED WITH U. S. GOVERNMENT)

MAIL  
THE  
COUPON  
FOR  
FULL  
DETAILS

GOVERNMENT SERVICES INSURANCE UNDERWRITERS  
CROCKETT AND PRESA STREETS SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS

NAME \_\_\_\_\_  
ADDRESS \_\_\_\_\_  
AGE \_\_\_\_\_ RANK \_\_\_\_\_ MARRIED \_\_\_\_\_ SINGLE \_\_\_\_\_  
CAR DESCRIPTION \_\_\_\_\_ ANNUAL MILEAGE \_\_\_\_\_  
BUSINESS USE? \_\_\_\_\_ DRIVERS' AGES \_\_\_\_\_

2 Great Policies for Marine Corps Personnel

# THE GREATEST FIGHTING TEAM IN HISTORY

## *The United States Marine Corps and the United States Navy*

Fellow members of the same great Service, the Marines and the Navy have proved the value of teamwork in the greatest war in history. Knowledge of the other man's job and problems, the first requisite of teamwork, will be even more vital in coming years. The best way for the Marine to keep advised of what the Navy is doing and thinking and planning is to join the U. S. Naval Institute and read the Naval Institute *Proceedings* regularly.

The U. S. Naval Institute is proud of the fact that many of the outstanding officers of the Marine Corps have long been members of the Naval Institute. It would like to have all personnel of the Marine Corps as members.

Therefore, the Naval Institute extends to the Marine Corps the same cordial invitation to membership that it extends to all the rest of the Navy. Regular Marine Corps officers can become regular members of the U. S. Naval Institute, and Marine Corps Reserve officers and all other Marine Corps personnel can become associate members. The membership dues in both cases are the same—\$3.00 per year, which includes the U. S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* without additional cost except in cases of residence outside the United States and its possessions, where an additional charge of \$1.00 per year is made to cover extra cost of foreign postage.

The cost of printing the *Proceedings* alone far exceeds the membership dues; but due to its reserve funds and its other publishing activities, the Naval Institute never makes additional assessments on its members.

Organized in 1873, the U. S. Naval Institute is one of the world's oldest organizations for disseminating professional military information.

Any U. S. Marine—Regular, Reserve, or Retired—can become a member of the U. S. Naval Institute by simply filling out the membership application blank printed below, and mailing it in with his check.

---

### APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP

U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE,  
ANNAPOLIS, MARYLAND

Date \_\_\_\_\_

I hereby apply for membership in the U. S. Naval Institute and enclose \$3.00 in payment of dues for the first year, PROCEEDINGS to begin with the \_\_\_\_\_ issue. I am interested in the objects and purposes of the Institute, namely, the advancement of professional, literary, and scientific knowledge in the Navy. I am a citizen of the United States and understand that members are liable for dues until the date of receipt of their written resignations.

NAME \_\_\_\_\_

ADDRESS \_\_\_\_\_

PROFESSION \_\_\_\_\_

## CHANGE OF ADDRESS

Please notify the Gazette immediately when your address is changed. Each change must include both your old and new address.

### NEW ADDRESS:

NAME & RANK (PRINT)

ADDRESS

### OLD ADDRESS:

ADDRESS (PRINT)

IF you subscribed at recruit depot, also list your home address:

ADDRESS (PRINT)

MAIL TO: MARINE CORPS GAZETTE  
BOX 106, MCS, QUANTICO, VA.

## PHOTOGRAPHERS

The Marine Corps Association will pay \$50 for color transparencies, and \$25 for black-and-white photos suitable for use on the cover of the MARINE CORPS GAZETTE. Combat pictures of Marines in action are preferred, but good shots of training, maneuvers or anything featuring Marines or a Marine Corps subject (including still life) will be considered. Vertical composition is desired in all photos. Selection of pictures to be published will be made by the editors, and final acceptance will be dependent upon security review. Color transparencies accepted will be returned after publication. Black-and-white prints accepted will be retained. Every effort will be made to return all other material submitted; however, the publishers cannot be held responsible for any photographs lost or damaged.

with the causes of the German catastrophe in Russia.

Reviewed by Major G. P. Averill

### Clearing up the Atom . . .

REPORT ON THE ATOM—Gordon Dean, 321 pages, illustrated. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. \$5.00

Gordon Dean, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission of the United States from 1950 until June 1953, in his *Report on the Atom* has written a remarkably clear and factual account of what the United States atomic energy program is, and how it has been developed.

Mr. Dean explodes the myth of Soviet backwardness in the atomic enterprise field.

In addition, he passes on, in a candid and frank evaluation, the fact that the Soviets have fissionable material in quantity; that it is not a difficult technical job for them to make workable atomic weapons; that she has exploded three atomic bombs and that there exists a supply of atomic weapons in the USSR.

On the brighter side, Mr. Dean explains the progress that has been made towards developing a new source of power and how isotope and radio-isotope research have given man powerful and versatile tools which will aid him in his understanding of the processes of life and the nature of the world around him. These tools can be used in biology, medicine, agriculture, chemistry and industry to bring additional benefits to mankind.

Mr. Dean has succeeded in doing what other writers of highly technical subjects have failed to do, and that is to write a very clear book. The average person reading it can enjoy and comprehend the complex problems that were encountered in the development of atomic energy.

Reviewed by CWO W. B. Kohl

### Gun Fire over Quantico . . .

BULL RUN REMEMBERS—Major Joseph Mills Hanson, 194 pages, illustrated. Manassas, Va.: National Capitol Publishers, Inc. \$1.90

*Bull Run Remembers* is a collection of essays, descriptions and extracts from records and private papers of the fighting around Manassas and of the changes which have come

over that quiet little part of Virginia since its earliest times. There are two excellent descriptions of the two great engagements along Bull Run, but the reviewer believes that they will be appreciated more by the initiate in Civil War history than by one who merely dabbles in it.

For example, the author goes into fine detail in describing the activities around the Neabsco, the Quantico and the Chopawamsic Creeks. He tells how Confederate guns, emplaced along the Virginia shore near Dumfries and Evansport (which we know better as Quantico) made life interesting and at times almost unbearable for the Federals who, for lack of a good roadnet, had to use the great Potomac waterway.

*Bull Run Remembers* was written by a man who has been living and breathing the Civil War in Virginia for more than a generation. Major Hanson, after a long career in which the writing of history was his central preoccupation, was superintendent of the park and the museum at the battlefield of Bull Run.

Reviewed by LtCol J. L. Zimmerman

## Books on Parade

**Report on Mao's China** Frank Moraes. An unbiased and impartial report on Red China today written by an official representative who has been behind the Bamboo Curtain. It tells of the rigid control of education, indoctrination of children and the relations existing between Russia and China. \$3.75

**Flying Saucers From Outer Space** Major Donald Keyhoe (USMC Ret). Maj Keyhoe has made a study of official Air Force files and has submitted this latest report on the status of flying saucers. An interesting and controversial book. \$3.00

**The Blue Hussar** Roger Nimier. An 18-year-old youth joins the French Resistance Movement in 1940 and later becomes involved in counter-organizations. It might well be called the French version of *From Here to Eternity*. \$3.75

**Von Runstedt, The Soldier and the Man** Guenther Blumentritt. A vivid study of von Rundstedt's personal history done by his Chief of Staff. Remarkable in concept and enthrall-





Using the "Walkie Talkie" in  
mock combat to relay front line  
information to tank battalion command.

## ON THE JOB... not "on the way"

Only Air travel puts men *on the job* five times faster! Just one key technician like this, when held up by slow surface travel, can play the devil with a whole regiment's important maneuvers. So it's good sense and sound economy to speed him where you need him — by fast, dependable *Scheduled Airlines!*

And even when the need is not so urgent, the *Scheduled Certificated Airlines* save the military up to 80% in per diem allowances — and 4 out of 5 pay dollars, which might otherwise be spent uselessly "on the way".

### INSURANCE

Only on SCHEDULED Certificated Airlines: \$50,000 costs just \$2.50. Also available: amounts \$5,000 to \$50,000 at 25c per \$5,000. Covers Stateside and much foreign travel — personal or official.

### 10% DISCOUNT

for official travel on TR'S . . . covers Full Service.

Saving the Military Millions of Vital Man Hours with Dependable, On-Time *Scheduled Service* . . .



## THE *Scheduled Certificated Airlines* OF THE U. S. A.

ALASKA AIRLINES  
ALLEGHENY AIRLINES  
AMERICAN AIRLINES  
BONANZA AIR LINES  
BRANIFF AIRWAYS  
CAPITAL AIRLINES  
CENTRAL AIRLINES  
COLONIAL AIRLINES

CONTINENTAL AIR LINES  
DELTA-C & S AIR LINES  
EASTERN AIR LINES  
FRONTIER AIRLINES  
LAKE CENTRAL AIRLINES  
MOHAWK AIRLINES  
NATIONAL AIRLINES  
NORTH CENTRAL AIRLINES

NORTHEAST AIRLINES  
NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES  
OZARK AIR LINES  
PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS  
PIEDMONT AIRLINES  
PIONEER AIR LINES  
RESORT AIRLINES  
RIDDLE AVIATION

SOUTHERN AIRWAYS  
SOUTHWEST AIRWAYS  
TRANS-TEXAS AIRWAYS  
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES  
UNITED AIR LINES  
WEST COAST AIRLINES  
WESTERN AIR LINES

ing in detail, it is a fine assessment of the events which contributed to the defeat of Germany. **\$3.50**

**The Deep Six** *Martin Dibner*. Cut off from the world of normalcy and balance, their otherwise tolerable flaws became sources of intolerable tension. This is the story of men fighting together, and then fighting each other. This is the story of those who are at sea. **\$3.50**

**Sheridan the Inevitable** *Richard O'Connor*. The youngest, the most aggressive, the most versatile and the most uniformly successful Union commander. An exciting story of his colorful career written in straightforward English. **\$4.50**

**The Rommel Papers** *H. Liddel Hart*. Erwin Rommel had recorded the story of his dramatic career and the exact details of his masterly campaigns. From this first-hand material, Mr. Hart has drawn a complete, authoritative account. Rommel's own sketch plans for the battles of Tobruk and Gazala are included. **\$6.00**

**Russian Assignment** *Leslie C. Stevens*. Unlike the many other books about Russia, this one seeks to explain Russia in human, non-political terms by showing the intimate life of the average Russian. **\$5.75**

**The New Military and Naval Dictionary** *Frank Gaynor*. The first comprehensive and up-to-date definitive glossary covering all branches of the armed forces. This volume contains over 7,000 terms, also defines the latest available and unclassified data pertaining to sonar, loran, atomic and radio-controlled weapons. **\$6.00**

**The River and the Gauntlet** *S. L. A. Marshall*. The story of the defeat of the U. S. 8th Army by Chinese Communist Forces. The first full report on the entry of the Chinese Communists into the Korean war. **\$5.00**

**The Spirit of St. Louis** *Charles A. Lindbergh*. The first complete account of the famous Lindbergh flight. The story of the planning, the testing and training that went into the grueling 33-hour Atlantic crossing. **\$5.00**

**Gourmet Cookbook** The all-around, most complete cookbook prepared by the editors of the famous *Gourmet* magazine. This book (illustrated) contains 781 pages of American and foreign dishes. **\$10.00**

MARINE CORPS GAZETTE • BOX 106, M. C. S. • QUANTICO VA.

## Subscription Order

Please START ☐ or RENEW ☐ my subscription to the Gazette:

NAME & RANK (PRINT)

ADDRESS

☐ **2 Years**

SAVE \$1.70 FROM NEWSSTAND PRICE

**\$5<sup>50</sup>**

☐ **1 YEAR**

SAVE 60 CENTS FROM NEWSSTAND PRICE **\$ 3.00**

I ENCLOSE FULL PAYMENT

Signed \_\_\_\_\_

☐ As a present or honorably discharged member of the Marine Corps or another U. S. armed service I am eligible for membership in the Marine Corps Association upon payment of my GAZETTE subscription. Please enroll me.

THE GAZETTE BOOKSHOP • BOX 106, M. C. S. • QUANTICO, VA

## Book Order

My check or money order for \$\_\_\_\_\_ is enclosed for the following books:

TITLE (PLEASE PRINT)	PRICE*

Send to:

NAME & RANK (PRINT)

ADDRESS

\* Members of the Marine Corps Association may deduct 15 per cent from the list price of any book in print. C.O.D.s can not be accepted.



## There I was — and no September . . .

"It all started when the CO asked me to give a fill-in lecture on night fighting," one of our friends told us recently. "So, remembering the excellent piece on night fighting in Korea that ran in the September GAZETTE, I headed for my magazine rack. Well, I'll be a sonuvagun if it hadn't clean disappeared! Couldn't find it anywhere. There I was, stranded, with a lecture at 0800 and no September!"

*Naturally we sympathized with him — and discreetly suggested he order a bound volume of the Marine Corps GAZETTE for 1953 containing all last year's issues, and a master index as well. Things are easy to find in that green, buckram-bound book. And it's the biggest \$5.00 worth of good reading and good dope on the market — material you can't find elsewhere.*

If you're likely to be stranded in the same way — or if you just want to keep a permanent file of the GAZETTE in your office or home library, we suggest you order one, too. Use the order form on the opposite page and mail it in today. No time like the present — and for bound volumes, that's now!

**GAZETTE BOOKSHOP  
Box 106, MCS  
Quantico, Va.**



# Prize Essay Contest

## announcing the WINNERS



**Group I**  
**\$500.00**

**Best Essay**  
**\$500.00**



**LtCol John J. Wade, Jr., USMC**—selected as the winner of Group I. LtCol Wade's *Of Mortars and Men* was also awarded the additional "Best Essay" prize of \$500.00. He currently is serving at Marine Corps Headquarters as Assistant Head of the Ordnance Branch, G-4.

**Group II**  
**\$500.00**



**Captain Nicholas A. Canzona, USMC**—now working on a four-volume Korean War History at the Historical Branch, G-3, HQMC, Captain Canzona was previously on I & I duty in Baltimore. His prize-winning essay will be published in an early issue of the GAZETTE.

**Group III**  
**\$500.00**



**Sergeant Henry I. Shaw, Jr., USMCR**—served on active duty during World War II, and again during the Korean action. Since his release he has published articles in the GAZETTE, *Military Affairs* and the *Journal of the American Military Institute*.

### Honorable Mention

**Group I**

Colonel J. D. Hittle, USMC—Major Edwin H. Simmons, USMC

**Group II**

Captain Robert H. Piehl, USMC—Captain Robert Asprey, USMC

**Group III**

No honorable-mention prizes were awarded in Group III.



## Marine Corps Association